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 3 
Introduction 
 
Humanitarian intervention raises some of the most interesting debates in international 
relations: it asks questions about the priorities of international justice and order, it 
inspires debate about the use of military force, and it has as its case studies some of 
the worst acts of human brutality in recent times.  Yet much of the literature on 
humanitarian intervention is dominated by one of two things: either ethical debates 
surrounding its moral legitimacy and the conditions for legitimate humanitarian 
intervention, or the analysis of why states have or have not intervened in a particular 
case.  What is missing is a holistic approach to humanitarian intervention which 
incorporates the theoretical debates with the practice of this type of intervention. 
 
The aim of this paper is to give a historical account of the evolution of the norm of 
humanitarian intervention.  The paper will use current theories of norm dynamics to 
assess how a norm of humanitarian intervention has come about and why.  The paper 
will focus on three cases: intervention in Somalia in 1992, intervention in Rwanda in 
1994, and ongoing international involvement in Darfur. 
 
Approaching the intervention debate by mapping its evolution has several merits.  
Firstly, it does not get bogged down in the intricacies of why states intervened or did 
not intervene in a certain situation, which often include very context-specific factors.  
I aim to avoid this in the cases of Somalia and Rwanda – which have been 
substantially covered by existing literature – by looking at them in the long-term 
context of the norm and by acknowledging that they in fact contributed to the 
evolution of the norm, the second advantage of my approach.  Thirdly, such an 
approach aims to move the debate from the emotive, knee-jerk „never again‟ rhetoric 
that has surrounded it since 1994 (and is aroused intermittently in the face of a new 
crisis somewhere or other) towards a more long-term understanding of the dynamics 
of the norm of humanitarian intervention.  The inconsistent international responses to 
cases of egregious human rights violations demand that we improve our 
understanding of this important norm. 
 
The research proceeds in several parts: first, a theoretical framework outlining the 
relevant theories of norm evolution; second, the research method and case selection 
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are set out; third, a background section sketching the norm of humanitarian 
intervention in the post-Cold War era will precede the case studies, which are then 
analysed in chronological order; and finally, a closing section will draw some 
conclusions about the present state of the norm and its future prospects.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
With the rise of constructivism in the discipline of international relations, there is a 
growing interest in norms.  The literature in this field tends to focus on one of two 
things: the influence of norms on behaviour in the international arena, or the evolution 
of norms.  Although this research is firmly focused on the latter, it is worth briefly 
addressing the former in order to establish why and how norms influence actors to 
demonstrate that the study of norm dynamics is worthwhile. 
 
First, however, a definition of norms would be useful.  Although the precise definition 
of a norm has been contested in the past, much of the current literature accepts the 
definition of a norm as „a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given 
identity‟.1  The most important thing to emphasise here is the notion of appropriate 
behaviour.  As Ann Florini points out, we have to distinguish norms from mere 
regular patterns of behaviour; the „sense of ought‟ imbued by a norm is what 
distinguishes it from other iterated actions.
2
  Although it is always hard accurately to 
discern an actor‟s motives, patterns of behaviour can be constituted as following a 
norm when actors believe that such behaviour is considered to be legitimate by a 
given community, whether or not individual actors agree with the validity of those 
legitimacy claims; the essence of a norm is that it is a rule that ascribes moral 
legitimacy or superiority to certain types of behaviour over others. 
 
Why should we concern ourselves with norms in international relations?  The power 
of social norms is well recognised in the study of domestic politics, but it is only 
relatively recently that attention has turned towards norms in the field of international 
relations.  Realism, as the dominant tradition in the study of international relations, 
                                                 
1
 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, 
International Organization, Vol.52, No.4 (1998), p.891 
2
 Ann Florini, „The Evolution of International Norms‟, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.40, No.3 
(1996), pp.364-365 
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has, in the past, focused efforts on understanding the dynamics of power and security, 
conceiving of the international environment as ontologically different to the domestic 
sphere of politics, with the former characterised by anarchy, mistrust and 
unpredictability.  There is little room for „standards of appropriate behaviour‟ shared 
among actors in this outlook.  However, few current international relations scholars 
would deny the existence of norms and yet the nature and extent of their influence is 
still the source of some debate.  Neo-realists, with their inherited focus on power, 
security and material interests, posit that prevailing norms reflect the preferences of 
the most powerful states in the system.  The contention here is that norms only 
influence the behaviour of weaker states as dominant states are acting as they please 
by setting the normative agenda in the first place. 
 
Without engaging in the debate to too greater an extent – for it is not the remit of this 
paper – the neo-realist understanding of norms seems to be lacking on three accounts.  
First, it fails to explain the adoption of norms that are not aligned with the material or 
security interests of powerful states, for instance norms against slave trading or those 
that constrain the type of force used during war; in other words, norms that seem to be 
particularly other-regarding.  Second, neo-realists simplify the nature of interests.  As 
the compliance with other-regarding norms would suggest, it seems inaccurate to 
characterise state interests simply in terms of power, wealth and security.  Moreover, 
a state‟s interests are a function of its identity, how it sees itself and how it wants 
others to view it within the international system.  Neo-realists fail to acknowledge the 
power of internal norms and domestic perceptions of appropriateness in shaping 
international interests.  Third, the neo-realist account of norms fails sufficiently to 
account for normative change in the international system.  Norms change even in 
times of stasis in international power politics.   
 
This paper therefore adopts a constructivist approach to norms.  This acknowledges 
that actors‟ interests and identity are social constructs, influenced by norms 
(international and domestic), and that, in turn, norms are social constructs, advocated 
for and contested by various actors in international society.  Kees Van Kersbergen and 
Bertjan Verbeek describe this as the mutually constitutive nature of international 
norms: „interacting actors construct norms; norms guide the actors‟ behaviour; and 
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norms may change the definition of the actors‟ preferences and even identity.‟3  
Norms do not just rise and fall in correspondence with shifts in the balance of power 
between states, but emerge in response to new issue areas, as a result of domestic 
agendas pushed into the international arena and even as a result of individual moral 
convictions.  Such an outlook makes research into norm dynamics distinctly more 
interesting and also necessary, as a better understanding of normative change can give 
us a better understanding of how to improve international cooperation and reduce 
misunderstanding and conflict. 
 
Because a large amount of the literature on international norms has concentrated on 
their influence on behaviour, relatively little attention has been paid to the theory of 
norm dynamics and particularly to how, why and when norms emerge and become 
established.  For the purposes of assessing the norm of humanitarian intervention, this 
paper adopts the framework for the life cycle of norms put forward by Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,
4
 one of the few studies that draws on other 
disciplines to outline all stages of a norm‟s life.  Their framework provides a 
generalisable identification and explanation of the different stages in the 
establishment of norms that is not distinct for one particular norm or type of norm.  
Accordingly, they provide a continuum for the evolution of norms, on which I will 
attempt to plot the norm of humanitarian intervention at the time of each of the three 
interventions studied in this research.  The three stages in the life cycle of a norm are 
outlined below: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. 
 
The first stage in the evolution of a norm is the emergence of a new norm.  Changes 
in the international system, new issues requiring international cooperation and 
individual agency can be responsible for the emergence of a new norm.
5
  Finnemore 
and Sikkink single out two factors that are common to the successful creation of new 
norms: norm entrepreneurs and the organisational platforms such entrepreneurs use to 
promote a new norm.
6
  Norm entrepreneurs are a crucial part of the constructivist 
understanding of international norms, as they are the element of human agency in the 
                                                 
3
 Kees Van Kersbergen & Bertjan Verbeek, „The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the 
Imprefect Competence Regime of the European Union‟, European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol.13, No.2 (2007), p.220 
4
 Finnemore & Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, pp.887-917 
5
 ibid., p.896 
6
 ibid., p.896 
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social construction of norms.  Norm entrepreneurs may be individuals with a 
particular conviction about appropriate behaviour in an issue area, they may be states 
or they may be transnational advocacy networks made up of activists and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).  Florini suggests that powerful states make the 
best norm entrepreneurs as they are in the position to increase the prominence of a 
new norm through their greater communication resources and status in the 
international community.  „Norms held by powerful actors simply have many more 
opportunities to reproduce through the greater number of opportunities afforded to 
powerful states to persuade others of the rightness of their views.‟7  However, Amitav 
Acharya notes that foreign norm entrepreneurs may have less success than local actors 
at advocating a norm at the domestic level.  In South-East Asia, Acharya found that 
norms advocated by Western governments, Western NGOs or even local leaders seen 
to be Western-leaning were less likely to become established or to attract regional 
legitimacy than those proposed by local agents „seen as upholders of local values and 
identity‟.8  In this way, transnational advocacy networks that can mobilise different 
local activists may in fact prove to be more effective norm entrepreneurs than 
individual or regional groupings of powerful states.  The economic and military 
dominance of certain states does not guarantee an image of moral superiority among 
other states, and can clearly cut both ways in the advocacy of particular norms. 
 
The initial function of norm entrepreneurs is to draw attention to an issue area, or 
perhaps even put a new issue area on the international agenda,
9
 as has been the case 
with environmental and human rights advocacy networks in the past few decades.  To 
begin with, norm entrepreneurs may have to „frame‟ a new norm in terms of existing 
practices and conceptions of the appropriate.  This is because emergent norms face 
competition from multiple existing and established norms which may directly conflict 
with their aims.  As Acharya contends, „Framing is necessary because “the linkages 
between existing norms and emergent norms are not often obvious and must be 
actively constructed by proponents of new norms”.‟10  As well as framing, norm 
entrepreneurs may engage in „grafting‟, by associating a new norm with existing, 
                                                 
7
 Ann Florini, „The Evolution of International Norms‟, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.50, No.2 
(1996), p.375 
8
 Amitav Acharya, „How Ideas Spread: Where Norms Matter?  Norms Localization and Institution 
Change in Asian Regionalism‟, International Organization, Vol.58, No.2 (2004), pp.249-263 
9
 Finnemore & Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, p.897 
10
 Acharya, „How Ideas Spread‟, pp.243-244 
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established norms in order to lend the new norm greater legitimacy.
11
  Although 
appeals to moral superiority and legitimacy may be used by norm proponents to 
persuade actors to adopt a new norm, norm entrepreneurs may also appeal to actors‟ 
interests in the course of their persuasion.
12
 
 
Although transnational advocacy networks are themselves organisational platforms 
from which norm entrepreneurs launch and promote a new norm, entrepreneurs also 
use international organisations such as the World Bank and the UN and its agencies, 
as well as regional organisations like the EU.  Although this is a good way of getting 
the attention of the many member states and raising the profile of a new norm, there 
are two caveats to the use of such organisational platforms.  Firstly, as Finnemore and 
Sikkink point out, different organisations have particular organisational cultures 
which affect the sorts of norms likely to be promoted by them.
13
  For example, the UN 
Charter places a strong emphasis on norms that uphold state sovereignty and that limit 
the use of force (a fact which will be discussed later specifically in relation to the 
norm of humanitarian intervention), thus affecting the sorts of norms likely to benefit 
from such an organisational platform.  Secondly, although international organisations 
can lend a normative cause the expertise it needs for its advancement (as has been 
seen in the case of the environment), professionals and bureaucrats can also slow 
down or halt the progress of a new norm through organisational inertia.  As Ole 
Elgstrom argues, „While a constructivist approach is correct in its prognosis that the 
proliferation of a new norm may be difficult to stop once it has gained an 
organizational platform, constructivists underestimate the force of resistance and 
inertia in organizational settings.‟14 
 
Before the second stage of a norm‟s life cycle is reached, Finnemore and Sikkink 
contend that a tipping point or threshold will be reached at which a „critical mass‟ of 
states will have adopted the norm.
15
  Their assessment of empirical studies on the 
matter have led them to the conclusion that such a tipping point – which leads to norm 
cascade – is unlikely to occur until at least a third of all states in the international 
                                                 
11
 ibid., p.244 
12
 Ole Elgstrom, „Norm Negotiations: The Construction of New Norms Regarding Gender and 
Development in EU Foreign Aid Policy‟, Journal European Public Policy, Vol.17, No.4 (2000), p.460 
13
 Finnemore & Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, p.899 
14
 Elgstrom, „Norm Negotiations‟, p.472 
15
 Finnemore & Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, p.901 
 9 
system have adopted the norm.
16
  Of course, the adoption of the norm by particular 
states may have a disproportionate effect on whether norm cascade (the broad 
acceptance of the norm) happens.  In this way, Florini may be correct that powerful 
states can provide leadership in adopting a new norm and are in the position to apply 
pressure in order that a large number of other states follow suit.  However, the content 
of each individual norm is likely to affect whether this holds true for each case.  It is 
also not only the most powerful states that can lead others to follow their example, but 
leading and respected states in individual regions may influence the whole region by 
adopting the new norm.
17
 
 
The cascade of a norm is characterised by different processes than those that occurred 
during its emergence.  While adoption of the norm during the first stage may often 
involve regional and domestic advocacy, the second stage in a norm‟s life cycle is 
described by Finnemore and Sikkink as something more akin to international 
„contagion‟.18  However, this is not simply an inevitable process, but one which 
requires active socialisation so that norm-breakers become norm-holders.
19
  Thomas 
Risse and Kathryn Sikkink define socialisation as „the induction of new 
members…into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a society‟.20  Socialisation 
begins with the initial adoption of norms by states for instrumental purposes - 
violating states make „tactical concessions‟ to allay domestic and international 
pressures - and may progress to the genuine belief in the norm‟s validity.21  Risse and 
Sikkink argue that the socialisation process largely draws on emotional persuasion, 
rather than a resort to reason.  It therefore involves „processes such as shaming and 
denunciations, not aimed at changing minds with logic, but on changing minds by 
isolating or embarrassing the target‟.22  The concept of socialisation assumes a society 
– in the case of international norms, an international society of states – which 
excluded members (states) aspire to be part of.  The stage of norm cascade therefore 
                                                 
16
 ibid. 
17
 ibid. 
18
 ibid., p.902 
19
 ibid. 
20
 Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, „The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction‟, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkinnk (eds.), The 
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p.11 
21
 ibid., p.12 
22
 ibid., p.14 
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relies heavily on states‟ conceptions of themselves as members of the international 
community.  „What happens at the tipping point is that enough states and enough 
critical states endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behaviour for the identity 
called “state”.‟23  Localisation, as outlined by Acharya, can be part of the norm 
cascade and socialisation processes, as outside norms come to be a means for leaders 
to enhance their domestic legitimacy by showing that they are conforming to 
international standards of appropriate behaviour.
24
  In this way, formal 
institutionalisation of a norm in the rules of international organisations and in 
multilateral treaties can assist the norm cascade as it „creates the preconditions for 
seeing the norm as appropriate‟.25  Norm cascade may also occur as states realise that 
their existing approaches and beliefs are inadequate to deal with new challenges.
26
 
 
However, the stage of norm cascade and the socialisation of states into adopting a 
new norm is not the end of the story.  The third and final stage of a norm‟s evolution 
is internalisation.  The thing that separates the end result of norm cascade (in which a 
large proportion of states have adopted the norm and that those who have not are 
ostracised by international society) and the internalisation of the norm is the degree to 
which compliance with the norm has become automatic and taken for granted.  As 
Risse and Sikkink clarify, „Norms can only be regarded as internalized in domestic 
policy when actors comply with them irrespective of individual beliefs about their 
validity.‟27  Indeed, the very taken for granted nature of internalised norms leads 
Finnemore and Sikkink to warn that such norms may become hard to identify, as they 
are so much part of normal behaviour.
28
  Perhaps one of the easiest ways to assess 
whether a norm has been internalised is to see whether or not its enactment provokes 
discussion.  Iterated behaviour and habit are likely to be part of the internalisation 
process,
29
 as a norm becomes normal practice in a given situation.  It is perhaps only 
when a new norm emerges to challenge an existing norm that debate about an 
internalised norm will occur.  Risse and Sikkink identify three causal mechanisms that 
                                                 
23
 Finnemore & Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, p.902 
24
 Acharya, „How Ideas Spread‟, p.248 
25
 Elgstrom, „Norm Negotiations‟, p.472 
26
 Acharya, „How Ideas Spread‟, p.247 
27
 Risse & Sikkink, „The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices‟, 
pp.16-17 
28
 Finnemore & Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, p.904 
29
 ibid., p.905 
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they argue are necessary for norm internalisation to occur: „processes of instrumental 
adaptation and strategic bargaining; processes of moral consciousness-raising, 
argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion; and processes of institutionalization and 
habitualization‟.30 
 
Having identified the three stages of a norm‟s life cycle, Finnemore and Sikkink 
acknowledge that not all norms will evolve successfully.  They identify two major 
factors that can influence the success of a new norm.  Firstly, the way in which states 
proposing a norm are viewed in the international system can have an impact on the 
degree to which other states adopt the norm.  They contend that „the fact that Western 
norms are more likely to diffuse internationally would seem to follow from this 
observation‟.31  However, we must be careful to remember that such a prediction will 
only hold true as long as the West‟s moral values are seen to be legitimate by other 
states.  Acharya‟s findings from South-East Asia suggest that an association with the 
West does not always aid the international acceptance of an emerging norm, and may 
in fact hamper it. 
 
Secondly, Finnemore and Sikkink propose that the intrinsic qualities of a norm will 
play a major role in determining its success.  This includes both the nature and the 
content of a norm.
32
  The level of clarity about what is meant by a norm and the 
obligations or prohibitions it will entail are important in influencing whether states 
will want to adopt it.  Jeffrey Legro is one among those scholars in the field who 
argue that the more specific a norm the more likely it is to be fully enacted.
33
  If actors 
argue about its content and implementation, a norm is less likely to be successfully 
implemented.  However, Van Kersberg and Verbeek suggest the opposite: „State and 
non-state actors in world politics are more likely to adopt vague norms... Vague 
norms allow actors to stick to their own interpretation of norms.  It thus becomes 
more difficult to determine what type of behaviour would constitute a breach of the 
norm.‟34  What can be identified here is that the clarity of a norm may have different 
impacts at different stages of a norm‟s life cycle.  When a norm is first emerging, its 
                                                 
30
 Risse & Sikkink, „The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices‟, 
p.5 
31
 Finnemore & Sikkink, „International Norm Dynamics and Political Change‟, p.906 
32
 ibid. 
33
 Jeffrey W. Legro, „Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism‟, pp.34-35 
34
 Van Kersberg & Verbeek, „The Politics of International Norms‟, p.221 
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vagueness may count in its favour, leading to broader international approval.  
However, when it comes to applying the norm – a stage distinct from the mere 
acceptance of the norm – the clearer the norm, the more likely it is to be implemented, 
as actors know exactly how to go about this and doing so is a relatively 
straightforward process.  
 
As well as clarity, the actual content of a norm – what the norm is about – is likely to 
have a strong influence on how far it progresses.  This is clearly something that is 
hard to measure and will vary over time and international context.  However, we can 
make an educated guess about the sort of factors that might play a role.  Firstly, the 
extent to which the norm can be aligned with existing international beliefs about what 
is appropriate.  If a new norm competes with established, successful norms, we can 
expect its chances of success to be lower, unless norm entrepreneurs can find a way of 
framing it in terms of such existing norms.  Secondly, the level of congruence with 
domestic norms can help determine an international norm‟s success at the individual 
state level.  Jeffrey Checkel refers to this as „cultural match‟: the extent to which a 
new norm resonates with „domestic norms, widely held domestic understandings, 
beliefs, and obligations‟.35  Thirdly, adopting a more neo-realist stance, Andrew 
Cortell and James Davis contend that norms are more likely to find domestic success 
if they are compatible with, or supportive of, a state‟s economic and/or security 
interests.
36
 
 
Although these conditions are just a guide to what we can expect, they will prove 
helpful in the analysis of explanations for the degree to which a norm of humanitarian 
intervention has progressed.  Likewise, the three stages identified in the model of 
norm evolution proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink will be useful counterpoints from 
which to measure the extent to which the norm has become established.  Judith Kelley 
remarks that each individual stage in the life cycle is „characterized by different 
actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence‟,37 and this is clearly a strength in the 
framework, as we would not expect the same processes to be involved in the initial 
                                                 
35
 Cited in Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis Jr., „Understanding the Domestic Impact of 
International Norms: A Research Agenda‟, International Studies Review, Vol.2, No.1 (2000), p.73 
36
 Cortell & Davis, „Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms‟, p.78 
37
 Judith Kelley, „Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election 
Monitoring‟, International Organization, Vol.62, No.2 (2008), p.225 
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emergence of a new norm to those contributing to its internalisation.  However, 
Finnemore and Sikkink‟s theory is not beyond criticism.  Van Kersbergen and 
Verbeek note that the framework has an underlying assumption that the norm in 
question remains the same throughout its life cycle; they do not sufficiently account 
for the possibility (or likelihood) that an emergent norm will have to adapt to appeal 
to as many actors as possible and may well be the subject of debate and bargaining 
that fundamentally alter its content.
38
  Cortell and Davis also contend that Finnemore 
and Sikkink fail to pay adequate attention to the role domestic political systems play 
in the establishment and adoption of new international norms.
39
 
 
Nevertheless, the model put forward by Finnemore and Sikkink provides a useful 
continuum, with easily identifiable key stages, against which this research can assess 
the evolution of the norm of humanitarian intervention.  They, along with other 
scholars in the field, also provide suggestions about the types of norms likely to 
succeed, thus assisting with possible explanations for the findings of this research. 
 
Hypotheses, Methodology and Case Selection 
 
Before turning to the case studies, I will briefly outline my hypotheses, method and 
case study selection. 
 
Hypotheses 
If the dependent variable is the evolution of the norm of humanitarian intervention, 
namely the extent to which the norm is accepted by states, enacted by states and 
ultimately internalised by states, I will be looking at three broad independent 
variables: 
1. Norm entrepreneurs – I intend to identify the key norm entrepreneurs, what 
role they have played in the evolution of a norm of humanitarian intervention, 
and how and why they have been successful or not.  I will also look at the 
organisational platforms used by the various norm entrepreneurs. 
2. Tipping point – The tipping point is itself in effect a dependent variable, as it 
is one of the stages of norm evolution.  However, I will aim to identify when it 
                                                 
38
 Van Kersbergen & Verbeek, „The Politics of International Norms‟, p.222 
39
 Cortell & Davis., „Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms‟, p.68 
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has occurred, as well as analysing the factors that contributed to the tipping 
point.  Most particularly, I will address the question of which states (and how 
many) need to have adopted the norm of humanitarian intervention for the 
tipping point to have been reached and norm cascade to begin. 
3. Quality of the norm – I will assess both the nature and content of the norm to 
determine what qualities of the norm have contributed to – or hindered – its 
success.  I am not necessarily expecting the quality of the norm to remain 
static over the period covered by the three cases under analysis, but this should 
serve to give a better insight into the extent to which the quality of a norm is a 
significant determining factor in the norm‟s success, as well as providing a 
better idea of which specific qualities contribute to norm success. 
 
The hypotheses that emerge from the literature assessed in the theoretical framework 
in these three areas are therefore: 
H1 – Actors seen as morally legitimate and not just the most powerful states will 
make the most successful norm entrepreneurs. 
H2 – The tipping point of a norm will not occur until a third of all states in the system 
(taken here to mean all UN member states) have adopted the norm. 
H3 – A clear norm will be more successful. 
H4 – A norm that conflicts with established norms will be less successful. 
 
Method 
In approaching the case studies, I will use deductive reasoning to test these 
hypotheses for the norm of humanitarian intervention.  However, my analysis of the 
case studies will not be confined to testing these hypotheses.  I anticipate that other 
factors determining norm evolution not adequately covered in the existing literature 
will become apparent.  Much of the literature is focused on particularly successful 
norms.  The less clear success of the norm of humanitarian intervention might give us 
new insight into other factors that explain this limited success.  Therefore, I will also 
inductively identify additional independent variables that contribute to norm 
evolution. 
 
In analysing the cases, I will use the method of process-tracing.  Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett describe this method as the attempt „to trace the links between 
 15 
possible causes and observed outcomes‟.40  For each of the case studies, I will 
therefore examine statements, decisions, justifications and actions of actors prior to 
the decision to intervene (or not).  I will also look at the relevant contextual history so 
as to cover all possible causes of the observed outcome, which is whether or not the 
norm of humanitarian intervention was enacted.  It is important to note at this stage 
that I am not trying to asses why intervention occurred or not, as this has been done 
before for the cases I have chosen.  Rather, I am trying to establish the stage of 
evolution reached by the norm of humanitarian intervention, a manifestation of which 
is either intervention or non-intervention.  To put it another way, I am interested in the 
extent to which the degree of acceptance of a norm of humanitarian intervention 
(among some or all states) led to intervention or failed to lead to intervention.  By 
using the method of process-tracing, I will therefore look at the justifications actors 
gave for their actions, and at the actions themselves, in an attempt to assess how much 
those words and deeds refer to a norm of humanitarian intervention and are shaped by 
the norm; i.e. the level to which the norm is affecting behaviour in the international 
arena.  This will allow me to deduce the stage of evolution the norm has reached as 
well as to identify the factors contributing to this. 
 
Case Studies 
I have selected three cases: US-led intervention in Somalia in 1993, the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994 and the ongoing conflict in Darfur.  I have selected these cases for 
several reasons.  First, there is some variance in the cases, making comparison 
between the cases useful.  Somalia can be seen as a „success‟ case.  The intervention 
by US forces was considered a resounding failure, but for the purposes of this 
research, the case is considered a success for the norm of humanitarian intervention in 
the sense that an intervention actually went ahead in an attempt to stop large-scale 
human rights violations.  Rwanda on the other hand is a clear case of „failure‟; 
intervention did not happen in time to halt the atrocities.  Darfur is a „failure‟ case, but 
less clearly so.  The international community has reacted to serious human rights 
abuses in the region and peacekeepers are present there, but forceful intervention 
without the consent of the Sudanese government has not occurred.  In this way, 
Darfur is not strictly a case of humanitarian intervention, but this very fact makes the 
                                                 
40
 Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2005), p.6 
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case interesting to this study. 
 
Secondly, the selected cases cover a considerable time scale.  This is important for the 
tracking of the chronological evolution of the norm.  All the cases are in the post-Cold 
War era, as I believe that a norm of humanitarian intervention did not properly begin 
to emerge until then.  Although some would claim that the interventions by India in 
East Pakistan in 1971, by Vietnam in Cambodia in 1979 and by Tanzania in Uganda 
in 1979 are cases of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War, none of the 
intervening countries justified their actions in humanitarian terms and in all cases 
there were considerable national interests involved.
41
  That leads to the third reason 
for selecting the particular cases chosen: in none of them were significant national 
interests at stake for potential interveners.  The reasons for intervention or non-
intervention are therefore more likely to be specifically related to the norm of 
humanitarian intervention and not other factors like geo-strategic or economic 
interests.  The explanations for other post-Cold War cases, such as the protection of 
Kurds and Shiites in northern Iraq by allied forces in 1991 and the NATO intervention 
in Kosovo in 2000, were more intertwined with national interests, making an 
assessment of the acceptance and power of a norm of humanitarian intervention much 
more difficult. 
 
Finally, a special note on the selection of Darfur as a case: it is not a particularly clear 
case as it is ongoing and international engagement with the region has covered several 
years now with periodic policy changes.  However, its inclusion as a case is important 
for the task at hand, as it is the most recent test for the norm of humanitarian 
intervention.  The international response to the atrocities in Darfur, and the extent to 
which a norm of humanitarian intervention has been referred to, is the best indication 
of the current status of the norm and of whether it is likely to continue to evolve in the 
future.  The outlook for the norm in light of the response to Darfur will be discussed 
more fully in the concluding section of this research. 
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Background – Humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War 
 
A brief historical overview of humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold 
War is useful in order to contextualise the case studies.  
 
First, however, a definition of humanitarian of intervention: for the purposes of this 
research, humanitarian intervention is defined as the use of armed force by one or 
more states within the territory of another state without that state‟s consent for the 
purposes of preventing or ending serious human rights abuses.  This distinguishes it 
from what some have termed „soft‟ intervention, which ranges from diplomatic 
pressure to economic sanctions.  It has been suggested that certain provisos should be 
attached to an intervention for it to be legitimately labelled as humanitarian, for 
instance Security Council authorisation or the primacy of humanitarian motives.  
However, I have chosen not to narrow my definition in such a way, as my project is 
not to assess when legitimate humanitarian intervention has occurred, but is rather to 
examine the evolution of the norm of humanitarian intervention, a process which is 
likely to include changing understandings of what constitutes legitimate humanitarian 
intervention. 
 
Several features of the post-Cold War era can explain the emergence of a norm of 
humanitarian intervention.  Firstly, the norm emerged in response to a new issue area 
in international relations.  During the Cold War and previously, the threat (or reality) 
of inter-state war had dominated foreign policy considerations, but with the end of the 
Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of African states from 
colonial rule came numerous civil wars and struggles for self-rule, and with them the 
gradual recognition that intra-state wars had the potential to pose a significant threat 
to international peace and stability.  With the end of the Cold War also came the 
ability for the UN, and particularly the Security Council, to become a more effective 
body for dealing with these new challenges.  No longer paralysed by the East-West 
impasse, the Security Council was increasingly in a position to find consensus on 
international responses to the challenges of the new era.  The years following the end 
of the Cold War also saw the increased establishment of universal international 
human rights norms.  As Kelley argues, the West‟s victory in the Cold War played an 
instrumental role in this process: „Just as ideas associated with the losing side of war 
 18 
or with economic failure often get discredited and just as winning coalitions get to 
construct a new order after political upheavals, the end of the Cold War allowed the 
victors to shape prevailing norms.‟42  The rise in importance of human rights norms 
can be seen as creating a normative environment more conducive to the emergence of 
a norm of humanitarian intervention (with respect for fundamental human rights at its 
core).  Finally, the post-Cold War era has been characterised by a technological and 
communications revolution which makes awareness of the internal affairs, including 
the human rights situations, of almost all states around the world possible.  The 
graphic images that can be instantly projected around the world of serious human 
rights abuses within distant states has favoured the emergence of a norm of 
humanitarian intervention, as the internal affairs of other states can so easily become 
the concerns of individuals and governments all around the globe. 
 
In April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688 for the protection of 
Kurds in northern Iraq following the Gulf War, arguably the first step towards the first 
humanitarian intervention of the post-Cold War era.
43
  The resolution is notable as it 
was one of the first occasions when the Security Council linked the internal violation 
of human rights with a threat to international peace and security.
44
  Resolution 688 did 
not authorise military action, yet two weeks later the US, Britain and France sent in 
troops to create safe havens for the Kurds.  The allies argued that the „overwhelming 
humanitarian need‟ made the intervention consistent with the tenets of the resolution.  
Iraq was the only state to publicly condemn the action.
45
 
 
The 1990s could be described as the golden age of humanitarian intervention, as the 
decade featured many cases of military force (or the threat of it) being used to stop 
serious human rights violations, including in Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone and East 
Timor.  Other than Somalia and Rwanda, international involvement in the former 
Yugoslavia dominates the literature on humanitarian intervention in this period.  In 
April and May of 1993, UN safe zones were established in Bosnia under Security 
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Council Resolutions 819 and 824.
46
  The resolutions came under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter (that relating to the use of force), but neither provided for enforcement 
action if the safe zones were breached until Resolution 836 was passed allowing for 
self-defence in response to armed attacks on or within the safe zones.
47
  In June 1993 
NATO started providing air support for the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.  Over the course of the next year, NATO involvement in 
the conflict increased, culminating in the bombing of several Serb targets in Bosnia at 
the request of the UNPROFOR command.  However, in 1995 the Serb campaign 
against Bosnian Muslims escalated, and several of the safe zones created in 1993 were 
the sites of massacres of Muslims, most famously in July in Srebrenica in which more 
than 7,000 Muslim men were systematically rounded up and killed despite the 
presence of around 600 Dutch peacekeepers in the town.  The following month, 
NATO Operation Deliberate Force began, involving large-scale bombing of Serb 
targets for 21 days.  It is significant that NATO force was authorised and requested by 
the UN, with Western nations providing the force and equipment necessary to stop the 
atrocities being committed by the Serbs. 
 
However, Security Council authorisation for the use of NATO force against the 
Serbians in Kosovo was less forthcoming.  In September 1998, Resolution 1199 was 
passed by the Security Council demanding an end to Serbian hostilities against the 
Kosovar Albanians.
48
  Nicholas Wheeler notes that Britain and the US wanted a more 
forceful resolution, but that Russia and China had made it clear in informal 
discussions that they would veto any resolution that authorised the use of force.  
Indeed, in October „Russian embassies around the world issued a statement “that the 
use of force against a sovereign state without due sanction of the UN Security Council 
would be an outright violation of the UN Charter, undermining the existing system of 
international relations.”‟49  Despite this, in March 1999 NATO started air strikes in 
Kosovo without Security Council authorisation after failed peace negotiations at 
Rambouillet.  Germany in particular was keen to stress that NATO action did not set a 
precedent for future NATO intervention without Security Council authorisation.  At 
                                                 
46
 UN Security Council Resolution 819, 16 April 1993 and UN Security Council Resolution 824, 6 
May 1993 
47
 UN Security Council Resolution 836, 4 June 1993 
48
 UN Security Council Resolution 1199, 23 September 1998 
49
 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p.261 
 20 
the time, both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President Bill Clinton 
presented strong arguments that the West had a moral responsibility to end the 
atrocities in Kosovo, although references to the geo-strategic interests given the 
region‟s proximity to Western Europe were also made.50  Blair in particular claimed 
that the West had an interest in intervening in Kosovo in defence of the values of 
human rights, self-determination and democracy, values that were intrinsic to the 
identities of Western states and therefore vitally important to uphold and defend 
elsewhere.
51
  However, Russia claimed that the US and Britain were using security 
and humanitarian motives as a mask for a desire to expand their influence in the 
Balkans.  This suggests that suspicion over the primacy of humanitarian motives 
played a role in Russia and other states‟ reluctance to fully embrace a norm of 
humanitarian intervention, or perhaps gave them a public reason for condemning an 
intervention they were against for strategic reasons. 
 
Speculation about the impact of NATO‟s actions in Kosovo on the norm have ranged 
from claims that it has severely damaged the prospects of widespread acceptance of 
the norm of Security Council authorised humanitarian intervention because NATO 
did not have authorisation, to the view that it has created a precedent for humanitarian 
intervention when the Security Council is unwilling or unlikely to react to 
humanitarian catastrophes in a timely fashion.  Jane Stromseth has observed that the 
views on the implications of the Kosovo intervention varied considerably among 
different NATO member states: 
At one end of the spectrum, some allies adopted a kind of „never again‟ stance… Germany‟s 
Foreign Minister argued, for example, that NATO‟s decision „must not become a 
precedent‟… The United States drew quite a different conclusion from the Kosovo 
experience, namely that Security Council authorization is always preferred but not always 
required… At the other end of the spectrum, some NATO states, notably Belgium and the 
Netherlands, seem willing to argue for humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for action in 
the future if the Security Council is unable or unwilling to authorize force.
52
 
The International „Goldstone‟ Commission on Kosovo found that NATO‟s 
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intervention, while not strictly legal, was legitimate.  It referred to the discrepancy 
between international law and a prevailing „international consensus‟,53 and called for 
an interpretation of international law to bring it in line with such a consensus „in such 
a way as to bridge the gap…between legality and legitimacy, between strict legal 
positivism and a common sense of moral justice‟.54  The Goldstone Commission thus 
pointed to the need for a legal framework for humanitarian intervention in instances 
when the Security Council fails to react to situations of egregious human rights 
violations.  This is something the US were particularly wary of.  Stromseth notes that 
„the United States declined to embrace a doctrine of humanitarian intervention in light 
of its open-endedness and potential for abuse.  Washington prefers instead to consider 
the facts and the circumstances of concrete cases rather than opening up a new legal 
basis for the use of force.‟55  The NATO intervention in Kosovo was also the source 
of controversy due to the means employed.  The intervention comprised largely of air 
strikes from heights of 15,000 feet, a strategy adopted to avoid risk to NATO soldiers 
but one which was particularly costly in terms of civilian lives.  This demonstrated 
the reluctance of Western states to risk soldiers‟ lives in humanitarian missions, a 
theme that will re-emerge in the case studies. 
 
Shortly after the NATO campaign in Kosovo, Britain became involved in the civil 
war in Sierra Leone which had raged since 1991.  In October 1999 the Security 
Council established UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone to monitor the Lomé Peace 
Agreement between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  
However, the situation deteriorated with the RUF capturing 500 UN personnel and 
equipment in May 2000, using the equipment to help their advance towards the 
capital, Freetown.  Following this incident and in response to the fear of Freetown‟s 
imminent capture, Blair launched Operation Palliser to evacuate British nationals 
from the country.  Once there, the role of the British forces expanded, as they 
provided support for UNAMSIL and secured Freetown against the expected RUF 
advance.  However, Sierra Leonean government troops captured the leader of the 
RUF before they made it to Freetown and peace followed relatively quickly, with a 
peace treaty signed in 2001.  As a result, the British intervention was claimed to be a 
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success for Tony Blair‟s policy of „enlightened intervention‟, the argument being that 
the rapid deployment of force and evidence of the willingness to use it was significant 
in the downfall of the RUF and their subsequent agreement to peace, despite the fact 
that British or UN troops did not have to resort to the use of force.  Therefore, 
although the British involvement is not a strict case of humanitarian intervention, as 
both the UN and British forces were there with the consent of the embattled Sierra 
Leonean government, the case is significant for the norm of humanitarian intervention 
due to the success it enjoyed and the claims that such an intervention could form a 
model for future international involvement in (African) civil wars. 
 
One of the most significant events in the evolution of the norm of humanitarian 
intervention since the end of the Cold War, however, was not an intervention but the 
release of the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), „The Responsibility to Protect‟.  The commission was sponsored 
by the Canadian government and comprised academics and statesmen from around 
the world.  The Canadian government, which, because of its leadership in the process, 
could be identified as a significant norm entrepreneur, set up the ICISS in response to 
the call by the then Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, for the international 
community to find a solution to the problem posed by serious human rights violations 
occurring within states.  Addressing the meeting of the UN General Assembly in 
1999, Annan said, „…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault 
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common 
humanity?‟56  Kofi Annan, also a significant entrepreneur in his role in putting 
humanitarian intervention and the need for consensus on the international agenda, 
made a similar call to the General Assembly the following year.  The ICISS held 
consultations in eleven different countries over a year and arrived at the responsibility 
to protect doctrine presented in their report published in December 2001.  The report 
firstly echoed the Secretary-General‟s calls for greater international consensus on 
what to do in the face of serious large-scale human rights abuses occurring in the 
context of increasing numbers of intra-state wars.  „The issue of international 
intervention for human protection purposes is a clear and compelling example of 
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concerted action urgently being needed to bring international norms and institutions in 
line with international needs and expectations.‟57  The commission thus highlighted 
the fact that the prevailing normative environment was still not sufficiently well-
equipped to deal with the challenges of intra-state war and the severe human rights 
abuses that so often accompany it; the emergence of a norm of humanitarian 
intervention lagged behind the need the international community had for a shared 
norm to address human rights violations within the borders of sovereign states. 
 
The commission identified one of the most significant barriers to the greater success 
of the norm of humanitarian intervention: its competition with the established and 
somewhat sacred norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention.  The way the 
responsibility to protect doctrine attempted to address this problem was to graft the 
new, emerging and fragile norm onto the old, accepted one, by conceiving of 
sovereignty as responsibility.  The notion of sovereignty as responsibility entails two 
particular responsibilities: „externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and 
internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all people within the state.‟58  It is 
this dual responsibility that the commission argued a state‟s sovereignty is dependent 
upon, and which leads to the notion of a responsibility to protect.  The first, external 
responsibility has long been recognised within the Just War tradition, which 
acknowledges the violation of one state‟s territorial integrity by another as a just 
cause for war as the former state is no longer fulfilling its sovereign responsibility of 
respecting the sovereignty of other states.  However, the commission proposed that it 
is equally legitimate to override a state‟s sovereignty if it fails to fulfil the second 
aspect of sovereign responsibility, namely to respect the basic rights of its own 
citizens.  By grafting the norm of humanitarian intervention onto the norm of 
sovereignty, the commission lent the former some of the legitimacy of the latter. 
 
As well as using the method of grafting, the ICISS fundamentally altered the language 
of humanitarian intervention.  The commission framed humanitarian intervention in 
the language of responsibility, shifting the old debate about whether a right to 
humanitarian intervention existed towards the contention that a responsibility to 
prevent serious human rights violations existed.  In framing humanitarian intervention 
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within the concept of a responsibility to protect, the norm arguably gained legitimacy 
from increasingly well-established human rights norms, which recognise the universal 
human rights of all and the corresponding responsibilities of rights holders to uphold 
the human rights of others.  Moreover, in shifting the focus of the language of the 
norm from intervention to the language of protection the commission may have gone 
some way to distancing the norm from associations with the aggressive, expansionist 
behaviour associated with more traditional forms of intervention. 
 
Finally, the commission laid out quite specific conditions for the use of force, 
emphasising that all non-forceful preventive measures should be thoroughly explored 
(if not enacted) before force is employed, advocating the necessity for intervening 
states to consider post-conflict reconstruction and long-term support in the wake of 
any use of military force, and lastly asserting that humanitarian intervention without 
the authorisation of the UN (ideally the Security Council) would lack legitimacy.  As 
the NATO intervention in Kosovo demonstrated, this last condition is the source of 
ongoing disagreement.  Nevertheless, the act of clarifying the specifics of the norm 
may, in the long run, serve to contribute to the future success of the norm of 
humanitarian intervention.  If states know exactly what they are embracing in 
accepting the norm, they are more likely to adopt it, even if they do not entirely agree 
with the conditions laid out by the ICISS; compliance with, and enforcement of, the 
norm becomes an easier task when everybody knows exactly what is entailed in the 
norm.  Whether or not the possible effects of the responsibility to protect doctrine on 
the evolution of the norm of humanitarian have in fact played out in this way will be 
examined more closely in the section on the international response to the crisis in 
Darfur. 
 
The responsibility to protect framework was presented to the UN General Assembly 
as part of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.
59
  The document was 
unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, representing the most compelling 
evidence that the responsibility to protect norm (including its provisions for Security 
Council authorised humanitarian intervention) was widely accepted by states.  In 
April 2006, the Security Council further confirmed this by unanimously adopting 
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Resolution 1674, which reaffirmed paragraphs 138-139 of the Outcome Document 
referring to the responsibility to protect.
60
   
 
Any contextualisation of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era would 
not be complete without a mention of 9/11 and the global war on terror.  I do not 
intend to speculate on the impacts of these world-changing events on the norm here, 
and perhaps it is too soon to tell, especially in the case of ongoing Western 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in assessing the state of the norm of 
humanitarian intervention in the case of Darfur, it will be worth considering a number 
of things.  Have the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan eroded the non-intervention 
norm, to the advantage of the humanitarian intervention norm?  Or has the significant 
loss of Western life (as well as Iraqi and Afghan civilian life) in the war on terror put 
the West off intervention of any form, and made the rest of the world suspicious of 
any deployment of armed force within another country‟s territory regardless of the 
motives given?  It will also be worth considering the bearing Western involvement in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have had on such states‟ capability to intervene elsewhere, 
regardless of their or other states‟ willingness to fulfil the responsibility to protect 
with the use of force.  The chronological proximity of the international engagement 
with the crisis in Darfur to these events may make it difficult for us to measure their 
full impact on the norm, but it is clear that the post-9/11 context is as significant for 
the current status and future of the norm of humanitarian intervention as the post-Cold 
War context was for its emergence. 
 
Intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 
 
In January 1991 Siad Barre‟s government was overthrown and Somalia descended 
into civil war and clan-based violence.  The humanitarian situation rapidly worsened, 
with drought compounding the effects of war, leaving the country facing a devastating 
famine.  It is estimated that over 300,000 people starved to death in 1992.
61
  
Humanitarian agencies struggled to distribute food aid as the security situation was so 
poor, and warlords increasingly looted supplies, using food and the threat of 
starvation as a weapon and means of power.  It was against this backdrop that the UN 
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became involved in the country.  The height of this involvement was a US-led 
military intervention that initially aimed to ensure the secure distribution of food aid, 
but went on to try to capture General Mohamed Farah Aideed, one of the leading 
warlords controlling much of Mogadishu.  On 3 October 1993, 18 US Rangers were 
killed and 84 injured in a 16 hour battle on the streets of Mogadishu which also killed 
around 500 Somalian civilians, in a failed attempt to raid a meeting of General Aideed 
and his senior advisors.  The body of one of the dead Rangers was dragged through 
the streets of Mogadishu, footage of which reached American televisions within 
hours.  Amid growing domestic criticism of the intervention, US troops began 
withdrawing from the country in early 1994 and the UN completely withdrew by 
February 1995, leaving the failed state to a lawless anarchy which persists to the 
present day. 
 
The disastrous outcome in Somalia has been attributed to several factors, among 
others, the inability of the UN, with its bureaucratic inadequacies, to fulfil its 
peacekeeping role in civil conflicts, the misguided notion of short, sharp military 
intervention to solve a complex humanitarian disaster, and the mission creep that 
occurred with the transition from the Bush to the Clinton administrations.  However, 
it is not the outcome, albeit tragic, that this part of this paper is concerned with.
62
  The 
focus here is the norm of humanitarian intervention and its evolution.  By analysing 
the decision to intervene, the degree to which the norm had emerged can be assessed 
and norm entrepreneurs – crucial in the early stages of norm evolution – can be 
identified.  The analysis is split into two: the UN Security Council decision to 
authorise the use of force in Somalia, and the US decision to offer to lead the 
intervention. 
 
The situation in Somalia had been on the UN Security Council agenda since 1991 as it 
gradually descended into a major humanitarian disaster, but of interest here is 
particularly Resolution 794 passed on 3 December 1992, which authorised the use of 
force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The resolution itself can give us several 
indications about the status of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention.  Of 
particular note is the part of the preamble of the resolution which reads, „Recognizing 
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the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its 
deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and 
exceptional response…‟63  What emerges is a picture of a Security Council very wary 
of establishing any sort of precedent for forceful intervention in response to 
humanitarian crises; the „unique‟ and „extraordinary‟ situation in Somalia demanded 
an „exceptional response‟.  The post-Cold War norm of humanitarian intervention was 
very much in its infancy, in this case a response to a new challenge facing 
international policy-makers, a challenge which they had yet to realise would rear its 
head many more times in the post-Cold War era. 
 
But was the belief that Somalia was truly exceptional really behind the language of 
the resolution?  Peacekeeping had begun to dominate the UN agenda since the 1980s, 
and many members must have been aware that dealing with internal strife in countries 
emerging from colonialism and the Soviet bloc would continue to become a more 
frequent part of their work.  The very wariness of the Security Council in avoiding 
setting a precedent for humanitarian intervention was surely a manifestation of the 
acute awareness that Somalia was in fact unlikely to be exceptional – many members 
wanted to avoid any permanent erosion of the norm of state sovereignty protected by 
the UN Charter.  In negotiating the resolution, China was particularly adamant that 
Somalia be referred to as a unique situation,
64
 reiterating in a press conference after 
the resolution had been passed that Somalia was an „exceptional case‟.65  One of the 
most significant ways in which the situation in Somalia was claimed to be unique was 
the fact that there was no functioning government in the country.  India, another 
country quick to stress that Resolution 794 did not create a precedent for humanitarian 
intervention, said after the meeting that the resolution had been passed in the context 
of an „extraordinary situation, with no government in control‟.66  Although India and 
China were not alone in guarding sovereignty against the potential threat of a new 
norm of humanitarian intervention, not all states were quite so wary of creating scope 
for similar action by the UN in the future.  The Zimbabwean ambassador, while 
acknowledging that Somalia was „a unique situation that warrants a unique approach‟, 
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said that the response „adopted creates of necessity a precedent against which future, 
similar situations will be measured‟.67  While those clearly against a norm of 
humanitarian intervention were quick to affirm the dominance of sovereignty, by 
agreeing to Resolution 794 they were unwittingly contributing to the tentative 
emergence of the norm by creating a benchmark against which future action (or 
inaction) would be judged.  By authorising the use of force in response to an internal 
humanitarian crisis, humanitarian intervention had become a new policy option which 
could be considered in future cases – it was no longer unthinkable for the UN to 
overlook state sovereignty in addressing such humanitarian disasters. 
 
The use of force permitted in Resolution 794 was authorised under Chapter VII of the 
Charter on the basis that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat to international 
peace and security.  Perhaps, then, the intervention in Somalia was nothing new for 
the UN, as it was merely a solution to a conflict which was threatening international 
peace and security and the internal humanitarian crisis had little to do with the 
decision to intervene; in other words, perhaps it was not really a humanitarian 
intervention and did not mark the emergence of a norm of this type of intervention.  
Once again, the language of the resolution itself and the negotiations surrounding its 
adoption are instructive.  The preamble of the resolution states: „Determining that the 
magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further 
exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance, constitutes a threat to peace and security.‟68  The link between the 
humanitarian situation and the threat to peace was clearly made.  Moreover, as 
Wheeler notes, although some members referred to the regional implications of the 
increasing numbers of refugees fleeing Somalia, many more explicitly acknowledged 
that the humanitarian disaster within the country required UN action.
69
  Wheeler goes 
on to argue that the declaration that the humanitarian crisis in Somalia constituted a 
threat to international peace and security was a new departure for the Security 
Council, as such an argument had not prevailed in the negotiations over the situation 
facing the Kurds in northern Iraq the previous year.  Ecuador, which had only agreed 
to intervention in Iraq because of the ramifications of the Kurds‟ situation on regional 
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security, and which had explicitly said that Security Council intervention to stop 
human rights abuses in Iraq would not be legal, argued in the case of Somalia that the 
Security Council could not „remain impassive in the face of human tragedy‟ and that 
it had „ineluctable responsibilities to save the Somali people‟.70  Significantly, Russia, 
which had also opposed armed intervention to protect the Kurds, said that it was the 
„international community‟s obligation to put an end to the human tragedy‟ in Somalia, 
requiring „the use of international armed forces under the auspices of the Security 
Council‟.71  The comparison with the case of intervention in Iraq and the rhetoric used 
by states in authorising Resolution 794 makes the humanitarian aspect of the 
intervention in Somalia indisputable. 
 
Negotiations in the Security Council and the adoption of Resolution 794 give us 
evidence of the (albeit tentative) emergence of a norm of humanitarian intervention.  
As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, new challenges in the international environment 
often lead to the emergence of a new norm, and indeed in the case of humanitarian 
intervention, the new challenge of an imploding state and the humanitarian fallout can 
broadly explain the emergence of the norm at this point.  However, the United 
Nations had been engaged with the crisis in Somalia quite some time before 
Resolution 794 was adopted and the use of force was considered.  What factors 
contributed to the emergence of the norm at this precise time? 
 
Undoubtedly the ongoing humanitarian disaster and the failure of UN non-forceful 
peacekeeping contributed to the Security Council turnaround, but Resolution 794 
would not have been possible had the US not offered troops.  This highlights the 
dependence of the norm of humanitarian intervention on the capability of states to 
carry it out.  A commitment to humanitarian intervention in theory would be relatively 
meaningless without the ability of states to enact the norm – the norm would not have 
got off the ground had the US not been willing to contribute the 30,000 troops it 
offered.  Indeed, President Bush acknowledged this fact in his address to the nation 
announcing the deployment of US troops in Somalia: 
In taking this action, I want to emphasise that I understand the United States alone cannot 
right the world‟s wrongs.  But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved 
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without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for 
broader involvement of the community of nations.  Only the Unites States has the global 
reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and 
efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.
72
 
This would support Finnemore and Sikkink‟s contention that for the tipping point of a 
norm to occur, it is not only the number of states that accept the norm that is crucial, 
but which states.  Clearly in the case of humanitarian intervention, the tipping point 
cannot occur until the states most capable of conducting forceful intervention have 
accepted the norm (and the responsibility of committing troops and resources).  This, 
however, does not mean that once states like the US have accepted the norm, norm 
cascade will occur – their commitment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the tipping point to occur.  Moreover, the US willingness to intervene in Somalia does 
not mean that it accepted an ongoing duty to conduct humanitarian intervention in 
similar future cases. 
 
Perhaps, though, it is possible to say that in the case of Somalia the US was a 
significant norm entrepreneur, advancing the norm in the Security Council.  The 
evidence, however, suggests to the contrary.  The US had not consistently lobbied for 
intervention at the UN and the US decision to contribute troops was in fact a rapid 
turnaround from its policy of opposing the use of force in Somalia for much of 1992.  
What, then, can explain this sudden support for humanitarian intervention within the 
US and the Bush Administration? 
 
The most common explanation for the about turn in US policy is that heightened 
media attention led to moral pressure on Bush and his government finally to act.  
Warren Strobel has, however, demonstrated that the „CNN effect‟ could not have been 
decisive in the case of Somalia as most of the media coverage (particularly television) 
occurred after the US decided to send in troops.
73
  It is possible that the Bush 
administration was so affected by their own sources of information depicting how dire 
the situation had become, that they felt morally compelled to act.  Indeed, Wheeler 
argues that Bush‟s personal „humanitarian impulses‟ as well as those of his senior 
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advisers contributed to his decision to intervene.
74
  This view would suggest that Bush 
was a norm entrepreneur in that his personal moral stance on the issue led him to 
propose humanitarian intervention.  Once again, this may not be entirely accurate. 
 
The situation in Somalia was desperate throughout 1992. If Bush‟s humanitarian 
impulses had been decisive surely he would have decided to use force at an earlier 
date when the humanitarian situation was just as catastrophic.  Instead, Jon Western 
argues that advocacy in the US put sufficient pressure on Bush and his senior military 
advisers for them to consider military involvement in Somalia after months of 
dismissing it as an option.
75
  As both NGOs and „liberal humanitarianists‟ in 
Washington began to collect more of their own information about the situation on the 
ground in Somalia in mid-1992, they began to lobby for the US to support military 
UN involvement in the country.  For instance, a group of congressmen, led by 
senators Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, went on a fact-finding mission to 
Somalia in June 1992 and returned to urge their colleagues to support a more forceful 
solution to the humanitarian disaster.
76
  Relief agencies used grassroots campaigns as 
well as direct meetings with the administration to lobby the President.
77
  Norm 
entrepreneurship was not limited to domestic pressure in the US.  For instance, the 
Irish President Mary Robinson conducted a high-profile visit to the country 
highlighting the plight of hundreds of thousands of Somalis.  All of these norm 
entrepreneurs, in one way or another, were appealing to existing values held by the 
US in their calls for the US to act.  Through their advocacy, they made it untenable 
for the US, a country founded on liberal values and respect for human rights, to turn a 
blind eye to the severe and widespread suffering in Somalia.  Indeed, writing in a 
Guardian article shortly after the US troops were deployed, Henry Kissinger declared: 
„The new approach [in Somalia] claims an extension in the reach of morality… 
“Humanitarian intervention” asserts that moral and humane concerns are so much a 
part of American life that not only treasure but lives must be risked to vindicate them; 
in their absence, American life would have lost some meaning.‟78  Although the hasty 
withdrawal of US troops after the deaths of US Rangers showed that, in fact, 
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Americans were not prepared to risk lives in defence of „moral and humane concerns‟ 
in a faraway land like Somalia, the link drawn between humanitarian intervention and 
US values by norm proponents at the time of the decision is notable. 
 
As well as framing humanitarian intervention in Somalia in terms of US and Western 
values, norm entrepreneurs engaged in moral shaming in their attempt to pressure 
Bush into action.  Most notably, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali criticised Bush in 
November 1992 for focusing too much attention on the situation in Bosnia while 
„ignoring the more acute plight of millions of black Africans in Somalia‟.79  By 
effectively accusing Bush of racial prejudice in his approach to international crises, 
Boutros-Ghali was not only attempting to shame the president into action, but was 
also appealing to US domestic norms of racial equality in trying to demonstrate that 
engagement in Bosnia over Somalia would amount to racial bias, something publicly 
unacceptable in the US. 
 
However, it was in fact the pressure for the US to act in the former Yugoslavia that 
may also have proved to be a catalyst for Bush‟s decision to intervene in Somalia.  As 
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to Bush at the time, recalled, „[Bosnia] 
probably did have a significant influence on us.  We did not want to portray the 
administration as wholly flint-hearted real-politik, and an airlift in Somalia was a lot 
cheaper [than intervention in Bosnia] to demonstrate that we had a heart.‟80  In this 
way, the decision to intervene in Somalia should not necessarily be viewed as a 
wholehearted acceptance of the norm of humanitarian intervention by the US, but in 
part a pragmatic response to the cumulative pressure on Bush to act in Bosnia and 
Somalia.  In reality, Bush seems to have been one of those wary of setting a precedent 
by using force in Somalia, indicated by his address to the nation: „To the people of 
Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes.  We respect your 
sovereignty and independence… We come to your country for one reason only, to 
enable the starving to be fed.‟81  This was clearly not just a message to the Somali 
people, but also to the rest of the world, that the US still very much stood by the norm 
of state sovereignty.  Despite this reluctance to set a precedent, in agreeing to 
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humanitarian intervention in this case, the US, like the Security Council, nevertheless 
created a benchmark for action in future cases. 
 
Besides Security Council and US decision-making on the matter, it is worth briefly 
considering the regional response to the crisis in Somalia.  Resolution 733, passed in 
January 1992, noted „the appeals addressed to the parties by the Chairman of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference…, the Secretary-General of the Organization of 
African Unity…and the League of Arab States‟.82  Yet, beyond mere rhetoric the 
regional response was minimal.  Indeed, Jeffrey Clark berates the OAU for its 
inaction, saying it „proved largely irrelevant as Somalia‟s tragedy unfolded a few 
hundred miles from its Addis Ababa headquarters‟.83  The only particularly notable 
response from an African nation was Eritrea‟s offer to intervene (after the US 
intervention), but this was rejected by the OAU on the basis that Eritrea was not a 
member.  In this case the organisation may have been particularly wary about 
Eritrea‟s motives in proposing unilateral intervention, but more broadly African 
nations were among those most cautious about making it clear that the intervention 
sanctioned by Resolution 794 was an exceptional response to a unique situation.
84
 
 
To summarise, the status of the norm of humanitarian intervention at the point of 
intervention in Somalia in 1992 was very much one of an emergent norm.  Despite the 
unanimous consent to Resolution 794 in the Security Council, such consent was very 
clearly not a collective acceptance of a norm of humanitarian intervention.  It is also 
not clear whether those norm entrepreneurs advocating the use of force in response to 
the humanitarian disaster in Somalia were just arguing for something to be done about 
that particular situation and were not in fact promoting a lasting norm of humanitarian 
intervention which could be called on in future similar situations.  Nevertheless, by 
supporting the intervention in Somalia, all actors, whether wittingly or not, were 
making humanitarian intervention a conceivable policy alternative for future cases 
where non-forceful peacekeeping failed to end serious human rights abuses.  
However, as much as Somalia clearly marked the emergence of a norm of 
humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, the disastrous implementation of 
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the intervention and its ultimate failure to resolve the crisis in Somalia had a lasting 
impact on the success of the norm, as the international response to the genocide in 
Rwanda demonstrates. 
 
Genocide in Rwanda in 1994 
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 has gone down in history not only for the horrific 
killing of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in just 100 days, but also for the equally 
unbelievable response of the international community to the unfolding disaster.  A 
civil war had been fought between the Tutsi Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and the 
Hutu government since 1990.  In August 1993 the Arusha Accords were signed, 
establishing a ceasefire and setting out plans for the formation of a broad-based 
transitional government.  Two months later the Security Council authorised the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to monitor the 
ceasefire.
85
  Several months passed as the parties failed to establish the transitional 
government, punctuated by bouts of violence by both sides.  However, in January 
1994, the force commander of UNAMIR, Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, was 
given evidence of a more sinister development.  An informant from the Interahamwe, 
the government militia protecting the president and the capital Kigali from the 
advancing RPF forces, told Dallaire that the militia was being organised and trained 
for the methodical killing of all Tutsis.  As well as lists of Tutsis and weapons caches, 
the informant revealed the Interahamwe‟s plan to kill Belgian peacekeepers in order 
to provoke a UN withdrawal.  This information was a chilling prediction of what was 
about to unfold.  On 6 April, a plane carrying the moderate Hutu President Juvénal 
Habyarimana was shot down as it is was about to land in Kigali.  Within an hour 
roadblocks had been set up around the city and the systematic killing of Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus began.  The following day ten Belgian peacekeepers were captured as 
they tried to protect the prime minister designate and were brutally tortured and killed.  
In 100 days 800,000 people had been killed, a rate of killing that reached 10,000 per 
day at its peak,
86
 yet the response of the Security Council was initially the reduction 
of UNAMIR, the dithering over whether to label the situation a genocide, and 
ultimately the authorisation of an ill-equipped and under-mandated military 
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intervention which did not arrive until after the RPF had declared victory and stopped 
the killings itself. 
 
This chapter will not go over every aspect of the international community‟s failure to 
react to the killing, but will rather focus on why the norm of humanitarian 
intervention did not prevail in the response to the crisis.  There are four significant 
factors that can help to explain the failure of the norm: the willingness and capability 
of states to risk soldiers‟ lives; competing norms of traditional, non-forceful 
peacekeeping; the role of potential norm entrepreneurs, particularly the UN Secretary-
General and the US; and the organisational culture at the UN.  As will be 
demonstrated, all of these factors were profoundly affected by the events in Somalia.  
Each will be discussed in turn to give a better understanding of the status of the 
evolution of the norm of humanitarian intervention and the reasons for its limited 
success.  The final part of this section will analyse the eventual decision by the 
Security Council to intervene (led by France), in order to assess the implications of 
this change in policy on the analysis of the norm. 
 
Just as Rwanda rose to prominence on the Security Council agenda, things started to 
go dramatically wrong in Somalia.  Indeed, Resolution 892 authorising UNAMIR was 
agreed to only two days after the 18 US Rangers were killed in Somalia.  As Barnett 
observed, the unfolding failure in Somalia coloured every aspect of the UN‟s 
approach to peacekeeping and intervention: 
It is virtually impossible to exaggerate the impact of Somalia on the UN.  Somalia was no 
longer a place name but was now a moment and a warning… Somalia could refer to what 
happens when good intentions are corrupted by unchecked ambitions, or „mission creep‟.  
Somalia could mean the need for the UN to get back to basics, to deploy peacekeepers only 
when there was a peace to keep and to decline the invitation to halt civil wars.  What would 
later be dubbed the „shadow of Somalia‟ was omnipresent, casting a dark cloud across the 
[UN] headquarters, limiting the sight lines, and directing its future practices.
87
 
We can identify various separate but connected aspects of the way in which Somalia 
affected the norm of humanitarian intervention. 
 
Firstly, the loss of peacekeepers‟ lives in a humanitarian mission intended to be 
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straightforward and low-risk contributed to a risk-averse international community 
when Rwanda came on the agenda.  Evidence for this can be found in the private 
discussions at the council about what should be done with UNAMIR after the killings 
had begun in April 1994.  For example, the British ambassador, Sir David Hannay, 
opposed the reinforcement of UNAMIR, asking members to „think back to Somalia 
and think about what you would ask these troops to do‟.88  This reveals two things 
about the norm of humanitarian intervention.  Firstly, like many norms, its evolution 
is highly sensitive to world events.  Secondly, it highlights the fact that the norm is 
not only dependent on states‟ acceptance of the principles at issue, but is also 
contingent on the willingness and ability of states to risk soldiers‟ lives.  The 
capability to contribute troops and materials will be discussed later in this section, but 
the fear of „another Somalia‟ in Rwanda shows that in the case of humanitarian 
intervention there is a distinct difference between widespread acceptance of the norm 
and the enactment of the norm.  According to Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life 
cycle, this might represent the difference between the cascade of a norm and its 
internalisation, as the consistent application of the norm will not occur until it has 
been truly internalised and enacting it becomes habitualised.  However, I would argue 
that something different is at play here.  The fact that many states were unwilling to 
risk their soldiers‟ lives in a repeat performance of Somalia, I suggest, does not tell us 
a great deal about their acceptance of the norm.  Of course, genuine acceptance of the 
norm of humanitarian intervention involves states‟ awareness that the norm involves 
the use of military force in the name of human rights, and therefore an awareness of 
the inherent risks to soldiers, but in an individual case of potential intervention, states 
might decide that the risks involved in that particular operation are unacceptably high.  
Therefore there are (among others) two factors determining whether states support a 
particular humanitarian intervention: whether they accept the norm or not, and 
whether they think the risk to their troops‟ lives is acceptable.  In other words, it is 
possible for states to accept the norm of humanitarian intervention whilst not 
accepting the risks to their soldiers‟ lives in a particular case.  There may be a 
threshold, which would of course be hard to measure, for what would count as 
acceptable risk, but as Somalia demonstrates such a threshold would likely be very 
sensitive to the prevailing international mood about the loss of life in combat.  This all 
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reminds us that humanitarian intervention is a foreign policy option.  Widespread and 
genuine acceptance of the norm may never eliminate the high level of discussion and 
debate that always accompanies foreign policy decisions.  This raises questions about 
whether the norm of humanitarian intervention can ever become internalised in the 
way Finnemore and Sikkink envisage, a point to which I will return in the concluding 
section. 
 
The second but related way in which Somalia affected the norm of humanitarian 
intervention was the realisation that intervening in humanitarian disasters is a 
complex undertaking.  Although this might seem an obvious observation, the decision 
by the US to intervene in Somalia was predicated on the fact that it could be a short, 
sharp (as well as low-risk) intervention.  As things began to go dramatically wrong in 
Somalia, policymakers realised that advocacy for humanitarian intervention would 
involve the acceptance of a norm entailing an obligation to become involved in 
complicated and long-term military operations.  This confirms the theory on the 
clarity of norms.  As the decision to intervene in Somalia was made by Bush, the 
norm of humanitarian intervention was still very much emergent and vaguely defined, 
and the US administration was able to interpret it to suit its military agenda; 
humanitarian intervention could mean the brief deployment of military force to ensure 
the distribution of humanitarian assistance.  What the disastrous outcome of Somalia 
showed the US and the wider international community was that humanitarian 
intervention was unlikely to succeed unless it addressed the root causes of severe 
human rights abuses, and unless states were prepared to endure complex and time-
consuming operations.  With its first application in the post-Cold War era, the norm 
was shown to be less straightforward than the US had interpreted it and its application 
suddenly seemed distinctly less likely,
89
 as Rwanda demonstrated. 
 
The third way in which Somalia had an impact on the norm of humanitarian 
intervention was that it provoked a return to more traditional interpretations of UN 
peacekeeping.  The disaster in Somalia prompted both the UN Secretariat and 
member states to re-evaluate the conditions of peacekeeping, and their conclusions 
                                                 
89
 For a discussion on the flawed expectation that a brief intervention would be effective in Somalia, 
see Walter Clark and Jeffrey Herbst, „Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention‟, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol.75, No.2 (1996), pp.70-85 
 38 
were unanimously that peacekeeping should be „neutral‟, „impartial‟ and „based on 
consent‟.90  The former head of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs summarised 
the findings of a commission of inquiry into the deaths of UN peacekeepers in 
Somalia by saying that the UN must „adhere strictly to the guiding principles of 
humanity, neutrality, and impartiality.  Once these principles are compromised, our 
legitimacy and utility are at risk.‟91  In the wake of the deaths of peacekeepers in 
Somalia, the Security Council had been discussing a possible framework for future 
UN peacekeeping missions, to give the council clearer and more uniform guidelines 
for when to authorise peacekeeping.  By the end of 1993, they had agreed that 
peacekeeping should only be authorised when the following criteria were met: „(1) 
when there is a genuine threat to peace and security, (2) when regional or sub-regional 
organizations can assist in resolving the situation, (3) when a ceasefire exists and the 
parties have committed themselves to a peace process, (4) when a clear political goal 
exists and is present in the mandate, (5) when a precise mandate can be formulated, 
and (6) when the safety of UN personnel can be reasonably assured.‟92  Suddenly the 
norm of humanitarian intervention was no longer competing with the sovereignty 
norm (as it had been when the decision to intervene in Somalia was made), but it was 
competing with these rules which referred to established UN peacekeeping norms, 
embodying a very traditional view of the role of peacekeeping.  As Barnett observed, 
„[peace] enforcement was out,‟93 making way for the resurgence of non-forceful 
peacekeeping.  The impact of this normative shift was easily observed in Security 
Council debates about the fate of UNAMIR after the shooting down of Habyarima‟s 
plane, as states including the US argued that the complete violation of the ceasefire by 
both parties should lead to the withdrawal of UNAMIR as there was no longer any 
peace to keep.
94
 
 
Fourth, Somalia affected previous norm advocates, notably the Secretary-General and 
the US, both of whose advocacy of humanitarian intervention had been decisive in the 
case of Somalia.  Just a few days before the killing began in April, Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali, who had been a significant norm entrepreneur during UN Security 
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Council deliberations on intervention in Somalia, talked about a new „UN mentality‟ 
in an interview.  He said, „Our whole philosophy is based on talk-negotiate-and then 
talk again.  To use force is an expression of failure.  Our job is diplomacy, the 
peaceful resolution of disputes…If you read the UN Charter…the whole philosophy 
of the charter is to avoid military force.‟95  One of the most significant and influential 
advocates of humanitarian intervention during Somalia was now publicly expressing 
his disagreement with the use of force in response to humanitarian crises, just days 
before the killing began in Rwanda.  As Somalia demonstrated, the Secretary-General 
is a significant norm entrepreneur.  This is because legitimate humanitarian 
intervention, in its most widely accepted form, has to include UN authorisation, and 
therefore the Secretary-General is tasked with presenting information and 
recommendations for action to the Security Council.  In doing so, the Secretary-
General is at liberty to frame information and policy options according to his 
preferences.  Barnett argues that this fact was significant in the case of Rwanda: 
In the case of Somalia, Boutros-Ghali passionately and persistently demanded an intervention 
on the grounds that only concerted international involvement could avert a famine, a famine 
that could claim upwards of a million people, which in turn could destabilize the region.  For 
good measure, he accused the council of caring for the rich man‟s war in Bosnia but 
abandoning indigent Africa.  No single statement by Boutros-Ghali on Rwanda came close to 
his appeal on Somalia.
96
 
Barnett‟s central argument is that because of the Secretariat‟s view on the use of force 
in Rwanda, information about the nature of the killing in Rwanda – that it was 
systematic ethnic cleansing and not just a by-product of the civil war – was not 
relayed to the Security Council, including the explicit information from Dallaire‟s 
informant warning of the impending genocide.
97
  Although many states in the council 
were against humanitarian intervention for other reasons, one wonders if they would 
have adopted the same policy had they known exactly what they were dealing with in 
Rwanda and had the Secretary-General advocated a plan for forceful intervention at 
an earlier stage.  In such speculation, it is worth remembering that many states were 
wary of the norm in the case of Somalia, and yet intervention was authorised 
unanimously once the backing of the Secretary-General and the US had been 
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established. 
 
This brings us to the role of the US as a norm entrepreneur.  In the case of Somalia, 
the US was identified as a significant entrepreneur, not only because of its position of 
power, but more importantly because of its capability to contribute troops.  As noted 
above, the willingness and ability of states to dedicate troops is a decisive factor in the 
application of the humanitarian intervention norm.  UNAMIR Force Commander 
Dallaire argues that: 
There was only a small list of peacekeeping nations who were capable of deploying units with 
all of the equipment and materials…needed… These nations were primarily Western and First 
World.  The slowly growing list of countries who were prepared to commit to a Rwandan 
mission came from a new generation of troop-contributing nations, who had large and 
untapped pools of soldiers but who were nearly completely deficient in matériel, 
sustainability and training specific to complex conflicts and vast humanitarian catastrophes.
98
 
Clearly, successful humanitarian intervention in Rwanda was reliant on Western 
countries, the most capable of which was the US, contributing troops and equipment.  
Yet the US was unquestionably unwilling to do so after Somalia.  Wheeler notes, „As 
a result [of Somalia], when it came to decisions on Rwanda, it was the spectre of more 
body bags that haunted the [US] administration.  Indeed an important indicator of this 
was its opposition to the rapid deployment of UNAMIR II, because it did not want to 
land US transports into Kigali airport under fire.‟99  The administration was under 
significant domestic pressure not to intervene in Rwanda.  After the loss of life in 
Somalia, President Clinton would struggle to defend to the public another similar 
operation in another African country of little strategic importance, regardless of 
whether the risk to peacekeepers lives was the same.  Barnett recalls, „There were few 
letters or phone calls to the US Mission to the UN or to the White House to urge that 
something be done, and these few signs of compassion were overwhelmed by the 
sheer number that urged the administration to resist the intervention temptation.‟100  
The former norm proponent (in the case of Somalia) became a norm opponent, and a 
significant one at that.  The US both threatened to use its veto on the deployment of 
UNAMIR II and also argued vehemently against the Security Council labelling the 
killing in Rwanda as genocide.  All of this supports Florini‟s argument that powerful 
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states serve as crucial norm entrepreneurs, although not only because of their 
prominence in the international community, as she argues,
101
 but also, in the case of 
humanitarian intervention, because of their unique position to enact the norm. 
 
It should be noted that there were states supporting intervention.  New Zealand and 
Czechoslovakia tried to use moral persuasion, especially once it was clear that a 
genocide was taking place, to shame the council into action, including an emotional 
appeal by the Czech ambassador, whose family had been victims in the Holocaust.
102
  
Once again, however, capability was decisive, as the fact that such states had little 
capacity to contribute troops to an intervention meant that their advocacy of the norm 
was relatively ineffectual.   
 
Finally, Somalia had a significant impact on the organisational culture at the UN.  
Finnemore and Sikkink talk about organisational platforms from which norms can be 
advanced, and point out that the institutional cultures of such organisations can have a 
significant impact on the sorts of norms that succeed.
103
  As the body authorising 
humanitarian intervention, the UN is the most significant organisational platform for 
the norm of humanitarian intervention.  In the case of Somalia, the bias towards 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the UN Charter may have contributed to the 
wariness states had of endorsing a norm of humanitarian intervention.  However, in 
the case of Rwanda, it was not just the prevailing norms of the UN (both sovereignty 
and, more significantly in this case, traditional peacekeeping) that hindered the 
success of the norm, but the bureaucratic culture that prevailed after the failure of 
Somalia.  Many in the international community had suggested that the UN‟s 
disastrous handling of the crisis and intervention in Somalia showed the organisation 
was incapable of fulfilling its peacekeeping role, one of its most significant duties in 
the post-Cold War era.  As a result, bureaucrats in the Secretariat went into self-
preservation mode; the view was that the UN might not withstand another failed 
intervention in Rwanda.  As Human Rights Watch criticised, „Most of the staff at the 
UN were fixated on averting another failure in peacekeeping operations, even at the 
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cost of Rwandan lives.‟104  As the administration under the Secretary-General, the 
Secretariat is in an equally influential position in terms of the information it provides 
to the Security Council and the way in which it frames such information.  Anything 
that might have led to Security Council authorisation of intervention was considered a 
threat to the UN, and information and possible military strategies were filtered 
according to this principle.  It is hard to speculate whether the Secretariat‟s position 
proved decisive for the norm of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, but Barnett 
argues that it had significant power to influence the Security Council, due to its ability 
to frame the council‟s discussions and the weight given to its observations because of 
its perceived impartiality.
105
  This confirms Finnemore and Sikkink‟s contention that 
organisational platforms are significant determinants of norm evolution. 
 
As this analysis shows, Somalia shaped the international response to the genocide in 
Rwanda in many ways.  The comparison between policies adopted in response to 
Somalia and Rwanda have also revealed the most significant factors that have 
determined the level of success of the norm of humanitarian intervention, notably 
norm entrepreneurship and the willingness to contribute troops.  It is important to 
remember, however, that the UN did (eventually) authorise a military intervention in 
Rwanda, initially undertaken by France, and later replaced by UNAMIR II.  Although 
many have questioned the moral legitimacy, methods and effectiveness of the 
intervention, for the purposes of this analysis it is worth considering why the Security 
Council changed its policy and finally agreed to the application of the norm. 
 
As awareness of the genocide unfolding in Rwanda increased, the pressure on the 
Security Council to act quickly escalated.  In this context, the reluctance of the 
council to name the violence genocide for fear of an international expectation that the 
UN should intervene demonstrates two facts about the norm.  Firstly, it may have 
been more widely accepted than the actions of the council suggest.  As the British 
ambassador argued, if the council declared genocide was taking place and then did not 
intervene, it would be a „laughing stock‟.106  The normative expectation of 
intervention in response to genocide existed.  Secondly, this expectation suggests that 
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there was a higher level of acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a response to 
genocide than there was of it as a response to widespread and serious human rights 
abuses in the context of civil war (as the violence in Rwanda was portrayed initially).  
This points to the fact that the evolution of the norm of humanitarian intervention is 
not a unitary process: one form of the norm clearly gained more widespread 
acceptance than another. 
 
However, when the council did finally call the violence genocide, intervention was 
not immediately forthcoming.  The eventual authorisation of intervention in 
Resolution 929 was in large part due to the offer of an intermediary force from 
France.  The change in policy by the Security Council, although undoubtedly affected 
by international pressure in the wake of acknowledgement of the genocide, was 
triggered by the offer of troops, as had been the case in Somalia.  Once again, 
capability was a decisive factor. 
 
What led the French to intervene?  Alongside the rest of the council, France had 
earlier voted to reduce UNAMIR in the face of increasing violence in Rwanda, so to 
what extent was a norm of humanitarian intervention a factor in its later decision to 
lead the intervention?  French policymakers used moral justifications, which 
essentially referred to a duty of humanitarian intervention, in public explanations of 
their decision.  For instance, French foreign minister, Alain Juppé, said that France 
had „a real duty to intervene in Rwanda…to put an end to the massacres and protect 
the populations threatened with extermination‟.107  Furthermore, Wheeler argues that 
the French had the benefit of domestic public support for intervention: „Thanks to the 
efforts of Médicins San Frontières and high-profile figures in the French humanitarian 
movement like Bernard Kouchner, there is strong public support in France for Le 
Devoir d’Ingérence.  This is the idea that individuals in distress have a right to 
humanitarian assistance and that this creates a correlative duty on the part of the 
international community to deliver it.‟108  Although this fact and the public statements 
in France about the offer of intervention represent significant references to a norm of 
humanitarian intervention, they do not explain the timing of the decision.  Wheeler 
argues that in fact France‟s intervention may have been cover for support of its 
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„failing ally‟, the Hutu Rwandan government, which was fast losing to the RPF forces 
taking control of much of the country during the genocide.
109
  He also argues that 
„French policy-makers were determined to stop the triumph of the “Anglophones” in 
what they viewed as their part of Africa‟.110  The evidence supports these realist 
justifications of a belated policy of intervention, as the French refused the entry of 
RPF soldiers in the „safe humanitarian zone‟ set up in south-western Rwanda, while 
the very same area became a sanctuary for retreating Rwandan government forces, 
along with the refusal by the French to arrest suspected war criminals, or to shut down 
the radio station broadcasting anti-Tutsi hate propaganda.
111
  The conduct of the 
French in their supposed humanitarian intervention suggests that they were not in fact 
driven by a humanitarian impulse: the normative power of humanitarianism did not 
motivate French intervention, yet it did provide a convenient justification for a policy 
driven by realpolitik.  Although this suggests that the norm of humanitarian 
intervention was not as established as French justifications implied, the reference to 
the norm by French policymakers is nevertheless significant in the evolution of the 
norm.  As in the case of US involvement in Somalia, although France was not 
necessarily intending to create a precedent of humanitarian intervention, by justifying 
its actions in terms of the norm, it was further embedding the expectation that it (or 
the international community) would – and should – act in a similar way in similar 
circumstances. 
 
The overwhelming impression given by the Rwanda case, and the half-hearted and 
after-the-fact intervention, is that the norm of humanitarian intervention was not 
sufficiently evolved and established to prompt timely action in response to the 
genocide in Rwanda.  Capability was crucial, as those states supporting the norm were 
unable to put their words into action without the support of more powerful and well-
resourced states.  However, capability is not the end of the story.  Willingness to 
contribute troops and resources was in fact the root cause of international inaction in 
Rwanda.  Some governments, including the US, had the capability to rapidly deploy a 
force sufficient to halt the genocide, but none of these were willing to do so.  This can 
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lead us to the conclusion that which states support the norm is crucial to its success, 
not necessarily the number, as Finnemore and Sikkink suggest in their theory of 
tipping points.  What is hard to determine in this case, however, is whether the 
support of the norm by a state able and willing to commit enough troops would have 
led to the widespread acceptance of the norm by other states.  All the factors 
discussed above, including the nervousness of states and UN bureaucrats after 
Somalia, and the lack of norm entrepreneurship from the Secretary-General, prevent 
us from determining whether the reluctance to create a permanent norm of 
humanitarian intervention expressed by states when dealing with Somalia would have 
persisted; there were too many other factors working against the norm. 
 
However, as much as Rwanda marked a low-point for the norm of humanitarian 
intervention, the very failure of the international community to stop the twentieth-
century‟s second holocaust arguably led to the norm‟s revival.  As Somalia had 
created international scepticism of humanitarian intervention, so Rwanda prompted 
the realisation that the international community needed to create the normative 
framework necessary to prevent a similar tragedy.  In the years following Rwanda, 
humanitarian intervention has been heavily debated, both among academics and by 
policymakers.  Rwanda also contributed to the normative shift led by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, transforming a notion of 
humanitarian intervention into one of a responsibility to protect.  It was into this 
normative environment that an ethnic conflict of a different nature in Darfur came 
onto the international agenda. 
 
The international response to the crisis in Darfur 
 
The civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan has been raging since 2003.  In April 
2008 two UN officials placed the death toll at 300,000,
112
 but others suggest this 
number of people had been killed by 2005.
113
  Although not characterised by the level 
of inaction that defined the international response to Rwanda, the increased support 
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for the norm of humanitarian intervention after 1994 has not materialised in the 
policies adopted by states towards the ethnic cleansing, or genocide (as some have 
labelled it), in Darfur.  Currently, the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) „is doing 
all in its power and with limited resources to provide protection to civilians in Darfur, 
facilitate the humanitarian aid operation, and help provide an environment in which 
peace can take root‟.114  Crucially, however, UNAMID was not agreed to by the 
Security Council until consent had been elicited from the Sudanese government (a 
protracted process that caused significant delays): UNAMID is not a humanitarian 
intervention, although it is authorised to use all means necessary to protect its own 
personnel and civilians.  This chapter will address why the norm of humanitarian 
intervention, despite apparently universal support for it in principle, indicated by the 
unanimous acceptance of the UN World Summit Outcome document in 2005, which 
made an explicit reference to the responsibility to protect, proved to have little impact 
on international approaches to the conflict in Darfur.  A number of issues arise, each 
of which will be addressed in turn: the ongoing dominance of the sovereignty norm, 
indicated by the need to get Sudan‟s consent for the deployment of not only 
UNAMID, but also its predecessor, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); the 
effect of the change in the language of the norm, brought about by the responsibility 
to protect doctrine; the prevailing international circumstances, which led key actors to 
prioritise other factors, including the fragile North/South peace process and the global 
war on terror; the perceived legitimacy of Western norm entrepreneurs; and finally, 
the capability of states, both Western and African, to enact the norm. 
 
 The international community‟s emphasis on the need for consent from Sudan and the 
cautious respect for its sovereignty can be found in almost all official deliberations on 
peacekeeping in Darfur.  The preambles to all the Security Council resolutions on 
Darfur include a standard reaffirmation of the council‟s „commitment to the 
sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan‟.115  Not only have 
states like China and Russia expressed the „overriding need‟ for the consent of the 
government of Sudan, but strong advocates of the norm of humanitarian intervention 
like the UK have stressed the importance of the consent of the Sudanese government 
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to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur.
116
  Even the African Union, 
which has one of the most explicit provisions for humanitarian intervention of all 
regional organisations, in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU,
117
 refused to 
act without the consent of the government in Khartoum.  Evidence for this can be 
found in a communiqué from an AU „mini-summit‟ in October 2004, in which 
members reaffirmed their commitment to Sudan‟s sovereignty and rejected the 
possibility of „any foreign intervention by any country, whatsoever‟.118  In its 
statement following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1706 authorising the 
expansion of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS – at the time already 
operating in southern Sudan) to include peacekeeping activities in Darfur (on 
condition of Sudan‟s consent), Ghana was the only state to suggest that Sudan‟s 
consent should not be the ultimate concern of the council, and explicitly referred to 
Article 4(h): 
In adopting [Article 4(h)], the AU member states set themselves the highest standards of 
accountability in governance.  But, more importantly, they assumed the responsibility to 
protect the victims of war on the continent.  Clearly, the situation in the Sudan merits some 
form of international engagement that is timely, meaningful, well-coordinated and effective.  
It is for those reasons that we have reservations about the inclusion in the draft text of explicit 
language that the Government of the Sudan can take all the time it wants before allowing the 
United Nations to deploy in Darfur, or even to refuse to do so, regardless of the cost in human 
lives.
119
 
Nevertheless, Ghana was alone in highlighting the apparent lack of willingness 
among other Security Council members to contemplate humanitarian intervention, 
even in the event of Sudanese refusal to UN peacekeeping in Darfur. 
 
What emerges is a picture of an ever-dominant norm of state sovereignty, which 
seemed to take unconditional precedence over humanitarian concerns in the 
international response to the crisis in Darfur.  I would contend, therefore, that the 
unanimous acceptance of the humanitarian intervention norm in the World Summit 
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Outcome Document (in the form of the responsibility to protect doctrine) may not, in 
fact, represent norm cascade, the second stage on Finnemore and Sikkink‟s 
framework for norm evolution.  The norm of humanitarian intervention was still very 
much competing with the established norms of sovereignty and non-interference 
during the Darfur deliberations.  This exposes a point not found in the existing 
literature on norm evolution – that adoption or acceptance of the norm, even in the 
formal institutional context of the UN, will not always translate into the automatic 
enactment of the norm.  This is an issue I will return to in more detail in the 
concluding section. 
 
For now, within the context of the Darfur case, it is worth considering why, despite 
all the international pontificating about sovereignty as responsibility, did the pledged 
support for the responsibility to protect fail to manifest itself during the Darfur 
deliberations, to be trumped by the sovereignty norm?  Clearly part of the explanation 
lies in the fact that state sovereignty is one of the most well-established and closely 
guarded international norms, so humanitarian intervention is competing against a 
tough opposition in its bid for a place in the current international normative 
framework.  However, Alex Bellamy argues that the rhetorical shift from 
humanitarian intervention to a responsibility to protect also played a role.  Despite 
apparently encouraging an improved consensus on the norm of humanitarian 
intervention, Bellamy argues that the responsibility to protect, in its emphasis on the 
primary responsibility of states to protect their own citizens, gave states an excuse for 
inaction.  The sovereignty of Sudan came high up in discussions because the 
responsibility to protect advocates an approach which uses state sovereignty as a 
starting point, perhaps one of the reasons why such an approach found more approval 
than traditional notions of humanitarian intervention had.  However, by reinforcing 
the fact that Sudan holds the primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, the 
responsibility to protect doctrine in fact lent normative weight to arguments against 
intervention.  For instance, the UK, despite being a key norm advocate, tried to justify 
its rejection of the possibility of forceful intervention with reference to the ICISS 
responsibility to protect framework: „the best way to deliver security to the people of 
Darfur is to get those with primary responsibility for it to do it…the government of 
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Sudan.‟120  It was not only states who endorsed the view that Sudan held the primary 
responsibility to halt the atrocities in Darfur: high-profile UN special representatives 
in Sudan, Jan Pronk and Francis Deng also voiced their support for this view.  As 
Bellamy notes, „Paradoxically, Deng argues that although the government “probably” 
lacked the will and capacity to disarm the Janjaweed, it retained the primary 
responsibility for doing so… He concluded that international intervention would 
“complicate and aggravate” the crisis by increasing the level of violence and causing 
the government to withdraw its cooperation.‟121 
 
However, as Deng‟s view suggests, there was considerable evidence that Sudan was 
not showing the willingness or ability to protect its own citizens, the point referred to 
in the ICISS report at which the international community should assume the 
responsibility to protect, meaning any calls for humanitarian intervention would have 
been legitimate.  Indeed, there was considerable evidence publicly available 
indicating Khartoum‟s complicity in the mass atrocities being committed in Darfur.  
This suggests then, that arguments stating that the responsibility to protect rested 
primarily with the Sudanese government were in fact used to legitimate a decision 
against humanitarian intervention that was made for other reasons. 
 
In looking at alternative explanations for the international community‟s reluctance to 
embrace the possibility of humanitarian intervention, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the immediate historical context – both within Sudan and 
internationally – was a factor in the failure of the norm.  Firstly, the international 
community, particularly the US, UK and Norway (all significant norm advocates), 
had been engaged in the delicate peace process unfolding in the south of Sudan, a 
process that was finally providing an end in sight for Africa‟s longest running civil 
war.  Paul Williams, among others, has argued that the decision to prioritise the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the 
Sudanese People‟s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the south of the country 
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can in part explain the „limp response‟ by the US to the crisis in Darfur.122  For 
instance, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said, „There is a concern that we don‟t 
want to put so much pressure on the Sudanese government that causes internal 
problems that might make the situation [in the south] worse.‟123  Others, including 
some of the most ardent advocates of humanitarian intervention, such as Ramesh 
Thakur, one of the ICISS commissioners, argued that advocating humanitarian 
intervention, let alone carrying it out, would have seriously undermined the delicate 
diplomacy involved in the North/South peace process.  This tells us two important 
things about the norm.  Firstly, the principles underlying the norm, namely the 
protection of fundamental human rights, may not always be best served by the norm.  
Even if the norm enjoyed unbridled success and was universally (and genuinely) 
accepted, it would not necessarily be appropriate to use it to stop every case of mass 
human rights violations.  Humanitarian intervention comes at the extreme end of a 
continuum of peacekeeping and conflict resolution policies, and as such will not 
always be resorted to, regardless of the stage of evolution the norm has reached.  
Secondly, the fact that exercising the norm in Darfur was constrained by the 
North/South peace process supports Florini‟s argument that „environmental factors‟ 
affect the successful evolution of a new norm.
124
 
 
These environmental factors also included the international context in which Darfur 
came onto the international agenda.  Just as Somalia fundamentally influenced the 
international response to Rwanda, and, in turn, Rwanda inspired a new push towards 
consensus on humanitarian intervention, 9/11 and the war on terror had a significant 
impact on international, and particularly US, policies on Darfur.  These events may 
help to explain why, as everybody marked the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 
Rwanda with utterances of „never again‟, the international remorse shown after 
Rwanda did not galvanise states into decisive action in Darfur.  Eric Heinze points 
out that the Sudanese government has emerged as a particularly useful partner and 
source of intelligence in the US war against terrorism.
125
  „Given the high priority 
placed on terrorism in Washington, it is no surprise that a forceful response to 
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“genocide” in Darfur would have to be weighed against the increasing need to 
befriend regimes like the one in Khartoum for purposes of anti-terrorism, despite its 
miserable human rights record.‟126  Moreover, it is not surprising that the US and 
other Western states engaged in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would 
have wanted to avoid war in another Islamic country.  Williams and Bellamy note the 
challenge faced by Western states „to find ways of responding to Darfur‟s crisis that 
emphasised their commitment to the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” but which 
did not fuel Islamic radicalism and encourage Sudan to become a haven for anti-
Western terrorist groups as it had been in the early 1990s‟.127 
 
Other than creating an environment inhospitable to the enactment of the humanitarian 
intervention norm in Darfur, the war on terror, and particularly the war in Iraq, had 
another effect on the norm.  The use of humanitarian justifications for the war in Iraq, 
which many argued were only invoked when other reasons (such as Iraq‟s alleged 
possession of weapons of mass destruction) were found to be based on poor factual 
information, damaged both the legitimacy of the norm and of those states engaged in 
Iraq that advocated it.  It led states to suspect that Western advocacy of the 
humanitarian intervention norm „masked neo-imperial ambitions‟.128  Indeed, Sudan 
itself expressed its concern about Western motives when it asked whether the 
Security Council‟s „lofty humanitarian objective‟ in Darfur was a „Trojan 
horse…embraced by other people who are advocating a different agenda‟.129  
Moreover, Cheryl Igiri and Princeton Lyman note that Sudan lobbied Arab and 
African governments, warning them that pressure from the US on the issue of Darfur 
was part of an attack on Islam.
130
  Other motives for Western concern about Darfur 
were speculated about in the press in various Arab countries, motives including the 
US wanting to increase leverage on Egypt, the desired overthrow of Sudan‟s Islamic 
government, keeping Sudan dependent on American food aid and the US aim to gain 
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access to Sudan‟s oil reserves.131  Clearly, the war in Iraq, and the US‟s broader 
campaign against terrorism and Islamic extremism, had a huge impact on the ability 
of the US and its Western allies to act as norm entrepreneurs in the case of Darfur, 
despite such states leading norm advocacy efforts in the wake of Rwanda.  
Furthermore, Bellamy suggests that there is evidence that the war in Iraq has not only 
had an effect on those states that were already suspicious of humanitarian intervention 
as an infringement of sovereignty, but also on states that previously supported the 
norm.  Soon after the beginning of the Iraq war, a group of social-democratic leaders 
rejected Prime Minister Blair‟s insertion of the idea of a „responsibility to protect‟ 
into a draft communiqué.  One of the states that rejected Blair‟s advocacy of the norm 
was Germany, which had previously supported the ICISS agenda.  Bellamy argues 
that Germany, as a vocal critic of the unauthorised intervention in Iraq, was 
concerned that the US and UK would use the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to 
legitimate the war in Iraq.
132
  Thus, not only did the Iraq war bring „humanitarian 
intervention into disrepute‟,133 but it fundamentally undermined the legitimacy of the 
US and the UK as norm entrepreneurs.  This provides some evidence for the 
hypothesis that the perceived legitimacy of norm entrepreneurs is crucial to their 
success in advancing the norm. 
 
However, although the perceived legitimacy of such norm advocates would have 
made any US/UK proposal for intervention deeply unpopular, no such intervention 
was proposed by these states.  Was this a form of self-censorship, as they realised that 
advocacy of humanitarian intervention would have been politically unworkable?  This 
may be partly true – the US and the UK would have realised the implications of the 
war in Iraq on any proposed future interventions (humanitarian or not).  However, I 
would suggest that another factor played a more significant role in the West‟s 
reluctance to propose humanitarian intervention, and was perhaps decisive in the 
failure of the humanitarian norm in the case of Darfur.  This is the capability factor.  
Although not quite the same as in the Rwanda case, where most states were unwilling 
to contribute troops, military overstretch as a result of large-scale operations in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan may have eliminated any ideas of Western intervention in 
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Darfur before they got off the ground.  Thomas Weiss argues that despite the fact that 
US power is such that it could serve as a significant advocate of the norm, we may be 
facing the „sunset of humanitarian intervention‟ because „its inclination to commit 
significant political and military resources has waned‟ in the wake of Iraq and the war 
on terror.
134
  Whether or not we are truly confronted by the sunset of humanitarian 
intervention – although I would suggest that the future progress of the norm is not 
necessarily irrevocably damaged by the present international environment – in the 
case of Darfur there was no question that the US, UK or NATO would be leading 
intervention or even troop contributions to a UN force.  This genuine lack of 
capability has manifested itself in the poor material and logistical support for first 
AMIS and then UNAMID.  For example, a report by the Save Darfur Coalition on 
helicopter support to airlift UNAMID troops to Darfur acknowledged that „demands 
for helicopters from the leading contributing nations and NATO members to support 
peacekeeping missions will have to compete with demands from other quarters… 
[For instance], in November 2007, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
asked alliance members to increase the number of helicopters based in 
Afghanistan.‟135  The inability of Western advocates of the norm to contribute troops 
or materials to existing peacekeeping efforts in Darfur also has an impact on their 
likely success as norm entrepreneurs: „It has become harder for these states to 
persuade others to act decisively in humanitarian emergencies at precisely the 
moment when those states themselves are less able to bear the costs of acting outside 
the world‟s institutional framework.‟136  The crisis in Darfur has also demonstrated 
that even if African states had the will to enact their commitment to humanitarian 
intervention (which, as argued above, it seems they did not), they do not currently 
have the capacity to do so, as their request for a UN support for the floundering 
AMIS shows.  For instance, in late September 2004, only 300 AU peacekeepers were 
on the ground, a tenth of the envisaged 3,000, and President Obasanjo of Nigeria 
bemoaned the fact that the AU, despite its willingness to deploy more troops, was 
unable to do so without international assistance.
137
  Therefore, even in a situation 
where the US and other Western states had abdicated responsibility for leading any 
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peacekeeping efforts, the alternative African initiative required significant levels of 
outside logistical and financial support, and would have even more so had forcible 
intervention taken place; humanitarian intervention in Darfur required Western 
capability and willingness to contribute in one way or another. 
 
Darfur is a highly complex conflict and the reasons for the reluctance of the 
international community to invoke the norm of humanitarian intervention in response 
to it are equally complex.  There was some advocacy for humanitarian intervention 
during Security Council discussions by the Phillipines, Romania and, as mentioned 
above, Ghana.  However, the demands of these states, unable as they were to lead any 
intervention themselves, were drowned out by calls - both by traditional advocates 
and by sceptics of the norm - to reject its application in the case of Darfur.  The 
sceptics of the norm, if they had endorsed the responsibility to protect framework 
when it was presented to the UN in the World Summit Outcome document in 2005, 
may have done so only because it reinforced their view of the primacy of sovereignty 
and of the notion that each state should retain its responsibility for the welfare of its 
own citizens.  Certainly this view, and their unfailing support for the sovereignty 
norm, meant that humanitarian intervention sceptics were not about to agree to the 
application of the norm in light of the atrocities in Darfur.  For their part, the 
advocates of the norm were hamstrung by their existing military commitments and by 
their reduced ability to advocate a norm that they had arguably abused in order to 
justify intervention in Iraq. 
 
The events of 11 September 2001 undoubtedly changed the international environment 
in many significant ways, and the lasting effects on the norm of humanitarian 
intervention are still uncertain.  However, Darfur, in its role as a test case for the 
norm, supposedly strengthened after the universal recognition of international failure 
in Rwanda, shows that the short-term effects of the post-9/11 environment on the 
norm were considerable.  Bellamy argues that „the level of consensus about 
humanitarian intervention has not perceptively shifted‟ in the post-9/11 era, and 
therefore what emerges from the international response to Darfur is the fact that such 
a consensus does not guarantee enactment of the norm.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the norm is still at square one in its evolution.  The widespread 
support for the responsibility to protect has had a positive impact on state behaviour.  
 55 
Although many would argue the response to Darfur has been seriously lacking, it has 
not been defined by the same indifference experienced in the case of Rwanda, and I 
would argue that this is a result of the growing influence of the norm since 1994.  As 
much as the post-9/11 environment may have meant that humanitarian intervention 
was never seriously considered, for pragmatic as well as ideological reasons, I would 
suggest that the international community has been compelled to act in other ways 
(something it failed to do in Rwanda) because of the progress made by the 
humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect norms.  This may be an 
interesting intermediate step in the life cycle of a norm, not adequately considered by 
the existing literature on norm evolution, whereby the cascade of a norm may not 
immediately bring about the policy intended by the norm, but instead brings 
international behaviour closer to such a policy.  Ironically, Darfur may show that the 
unwillingness and inability of states to conduct humanitarian intervention, combined 
with their acceptance of the norm in principle, has led them more actively to support 
alternative solutions to the crisis.  Of course, the international response to Darfur is 
not beyond criticism, but it has shown that some normative progress has been made 
since Rwanda: inaction is no longer a policy option when the world is faced with a 
monumental case of human suffering. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Using the findings from the case studies, I can return to assess my original 
hypotheses, beginning with H1, which asserts that actors perceived as morally 
legitimate, and not just powerful states, will make the best norm entrepreneurs.  The 
Darfur case suggests this may be true, as Western states involved in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, particularly the US and the UK, were less able to advance the cause of 
the norm, due to international scepticism about their motives.  However, I would 
argue that in the case of the humanitarian intervention norm, the power (in the 
traditional, realist sense) of norm entrepreneurs is still highly important.  This is 
because to experience the highest level of success as a norm entrepreneur – i.e. to get 
other states to agree to humanitarian intervention – the state (or group of states) has to 
be in the position to lead an intervention, or at least contribute a significant number of 
troops and other material support.  As was shown in all three cases, advocacy of the 
norm by states without the military might to lead an intervention was relatively 
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ineffective, as it was only when countries like the US and France (in Somalia and 
Rwanda respectively) offered troops that humanitarian intervention actually went 
ahead.  This is not to say military power will always be decisive in norm 
entrepreneurship for all norms, but in the case of humanitarian intervention, a norm 
requiring the use of armed force, military prowess will be highly relevant to any 
successful advocacy of the norm.  This highlights the fact that any attempt to find a 
one-size-fits-all theoretical framework for the evolution of norms may be futile: 
individual characteristics of the norm may have a big impact on what leads to its 
success or not. 
 
My second hypothesis (H2), which was based on Finnemore and Sikkink‟s assertion 
that the tipping point will not occur until a third of all states have adopted the norm, is 
much harder to draw firm conclusions on.  From the three cases analysed, it is not 
entirely clear when the tipping point occurred.  We can perhaps narrow it down to 
occurring some time between Rwanda, when there was very little acceptance of the 
norm, and the unanimous acceptance of the World Summit Outcome Document in 
2005.  Maybe at some point during the ICISS consultations during 2000 and 2001, 
enough states voiced their support for the norm that others followed suit when the 
commission‟s findings were presented to the General Assembly.  However, it is hard 
to tell, as the vast majority of those who participated in the ICISS roundtables were 
not government representatives and so it is difficult to get an accurate picture of 
states‟ perceptions at the time.138  This exposes a conceptual difficulty with the 
„tipping point‟: it may be true that once a certain number of states have adopted and 
advocated a norm, a sort of domino effect occurs and increasing numbers of states 
follow suit, for reasons of conformity, but this threshold will always be incredibly 
hard to measure.  As conceded by Finnemore and Sikkink, an estimate of the number 
of states accepting a norm required for norm cascade will never be absolute, as which 
states, as well as how many, will be important.  In the case of humanitarian 
intervention, it may have been that significant states from the developing world had to 
adopt the norm before others would follow suit.  This is because it has historically 
been those states emerging from colonialism and the Soviet bloc that have most 
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closely guarded the sovereignty norm, and which have been most suspicious of 
Western attempts to weaken it.  Clearly more research on the notion of norm tipping 
points is needed. 
 
H3 – that a clear norm will be more successful – might be a little easier to draw some 
conclusions on, though it is also not entirely straightforward.  The case of Somalia 
showed that in its emergent, undefined state, the norm of humanitarian intervention 
was embraced by the US, because it could be what the Bush administration wanted it 
to be: they could conduct a short sharp armed response to a humanitarian crisis in 
order to assuage calls for a more protracted intervention in the former Yugoslavia.  
However, the eventual failure in Somalia clarified the norm to some extent, 
demonstrating that any humanitarian intervention would have to address political and 
socio-economic causes of a crisis, and may be a prolonged commitment.  Suddenly, 
the norm was less appealing to those likely to shoulder its burden.  Although this 
evidence appears to disprove H3, I would argue that this is not necessarily the case.  
The international community‟s rejection of the humanitarian intervention norm in the 
case of Rwanda was not determined by the clarity of the norm, but rather was a result 
of a disapproval of what the norm entailed.  Indeed, the later unanimous acceptance of 
the responsibility to protect framework provides convincing evidence to support 
hypothesis H3, as states were clearly more willing to agree to the norm once they 
knew exactly what they were agreeing to.  Of course, there are other factors that can 
explain the success (at least in principle) of the responsibility to protect doctrine, but 
the fact that states knew without doubt what would constitute legitimate intervention 
in the future must have allayed some of their fears about the abuse of the norm. 
 
Overall, the difference between the acceptance of the norm in the early Somalia case 
(while the norm was still emergent), and the acceptance of it (at least in theory) at the 
point of norm cascade, when the norm in the form of the responsibility to protect had 
become more established, confirms one of the assertions made in the theoretical 
framework.  This is that vague norms are more successful in the early stages of norm 
evolution, but that the more established a norm becomes, the more necessary it is for 
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its terms to be clarified in order that it achieve more widespread acceptance.
139
  This 
also supports the broader theory that it is likely that different factors will determine 
the success of a norm at different stages in its life cycle. 
 
Finally, my fourth hypothesis, H4, that a norm that competes with established norms 
will be less successful, is strongly supported by the evidence from all three cases.  Of 
course, this will come as no surprise to humanitarian intervention theorists, who have 
long discussed its conflict with the well-established state sovereignty norm.  
However, in this respect, the Rwanda case revealed the interesting evidence that in 
fact competition with the sovereignty norm was not decisive.  It instead showed that 
more recent, but still comparatively well-established peacekeeping norms, which 
emphasised the inherently neutral and non-forceful characteristics of traditional UN 
peacekeeping, were more of an obstacle to the application of the humanitarian 
intervention norm in Rwanda.  Nevertheless, this still supports the hypothesis that 
competition with existing norms will hamper a new norm‟s progress.  Furthermore, 
the dominance of the sovereignty norm and the barrier it posed to decisive action in 
Darfur, showed that the way towards success for the humanitarian intervention norm 
is still very much impeded by the established norms of sovereignty and non-
interference.  It is perhaps only going to be attempts like those made by the ICISS to 
graft the humanitarian intervention norm onto these existing norms that will 
contribute to any progress for norm. 
 
The variance in outcome in the case of Somalia – that although there were concerns 
about preserving the norm of sovereignty, intervention still went ahead – does not 
necessarily disprove H4.  It is possible that the existing norms did not impede the 
norm of humanitarian intervention during deliberations over Somalia as much as they 
did in the other two cases because the norm was still in a very emergent phase of its 
evolution.  States advocating humanitarian intervention in Somalia were able to gain 
support for the policy by asserting that it would be a one-off, exceptional response to 
a unique situation, and in fact many of them believed that this should be the case.  The 
established norms of sovereignty and non-intervention were not such a barrier at this 
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stage of the norm because there was little recognition by states that the norm was 
being created at all.  In contrast, in the cases of Rwanda and Darfur, it was clear that a 
norm of humanitarian intervention (however fragile) existed, and that those against it 
would have to refer to competing and more established norms in order to oppose it.  
Once again, we can see that the stage of the norm‟s evolution affects the extent to 
which different variables come into play. 
 
Beyond the four hypotheses, this fact is worth exploring a little more, especially 
because there is variance between the cases – i.e. whether intervention occurred or 
not.  Some factors were common to all three cases, for example, in all three cases the 
capability or willingness to contribute troops was crucial to the enactment of the 
norm, and the world context played a significant role in determining whether or not 
intervention occurred. 
 
However, there are some features of the different cases that vary.  First, in the case of 
Somalia, framing the norm in terms of domestically accepted norms was particularly 
crucial to the advocacy of the norm at the international level by the US.  This was not 
as significant in the case of Darfur, perhaps because there was, by then, a broad 
acceptance of the underlying principles of the norm – it was no longer at an emergent 
stage – and discussion instead revolved around the application of the norm (how, 
when, and under what circumstances). 
 
Second, geo-strategic interests seemed to play a bigger role in the latter two cases.  It 
is hard draw a definite conclusion from just these three cases about whether this factor 
was not at play in the case of Somalia because the norm was still emergent, or 
whether it was simply that the initial post-Cold War environment was one in which 
traditional concerns of security and power were less pressing for Western states than 
they had been (and arguably are now).  There is clearly a need for further research on 
this interesting aspect of norm dynamics.  To what extent are neo-realists right in 
asserting that norms aligned with the geo-strategic interests of states are more likely 
to be successful?  Perhaps this fact is more pertinent in the case of a norm like 
humanitarian intervention which relies on the use of military force, making it harder 
to detach its application from traditional security concerns. 
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Thirdly, the legitimacy of norm entrepreneurs (H1) played a highly significant role in 
the case of Darfur, a factor which did not particularly feature in considerations about 
intervention in the Somalia case.  However, I would suggest that this was in fact 
because of the changing international context, and not because the norm of 
humanitarian intervention was at a different stage in its evolution.  In other words, the 
states which were most likely and able to advocate humanitarian intervention stayed 
the same across the cases (i.e. Western states with the requisite military capabilities), 
while their legitimacy as norm advocates did not.  This, as opposed to the changing 
stage of norm evolution, can go some way to explaining the variance between the 
positive outcome in Somalia - one in which intervention did occur - and that in 
Darfur, where it did not.   
 
Before a brief discussion on the future of the norm of humanitarian intervention, a 
few more inductive observations about the norm can be made in light of the cases.  
First, it becomes apparent that there has not been significant non-governmental norm 
entrepreneurship in the case of humanitarian intervention.  Although some NGOs 
have campaigned for action in response to each of the crises, none of them were 
advocating humanitarian intervention per se.  No high profile international NGO has 
adopted the cause of humanitarian intervention as a permanent international policy 
option, perhaps because most humanitarian NGOs typically shy away from the highly 
politicised issue of the use of armed force.  Has this lack of civil society advocacy 
affected the norm detrimentally?  Certainly transnational advocacy networks can add 
global legitimacy and prominence to an issue area – legitimacy (and perceived 
neutrality) that states may often lack - as they have done with the environment and the 
use of land mines, for example.  However, in the case of humanitarian intervention, 
the use of armed force, as an intrinsically state-led action, may be less susceptible to 
civil society advocacy, and thus non-governmental norm entrepreneurship may be less 
significant in determining the norm‟s success than it is in the case of other norms.  
Nevertheless, global civil society has played a huge role in advancing the human 
rights norms that have been crucial to the success of humanitarian intervention thus 
far. 
 
Second, what can be made of the universal acceptance of the responsibility to protect 
framework set out in the World Summit Outcome Document?  Does it represent norm 
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cascade?  Perhaps, but the adoption of this document might not represent a genuine 
acceptance by all states of the responsibility to protect norm, as suggested by the 
international response to Darfur.  Some states may have agreed to the norm to 
conform with international expectations without actually accepting its moral validity.  
This represents part of the socialisation process involved in the norm cascade stage of 
norm evolution.
140
  What is important here is the distinction between widespread 
rhetorical acceptance of the norm and its genuine acceptance which should lead to its 
enactment.  Nevertheless, the agreement of states to the responsibility to protect in the 
outcome document, while it may not represent universal adoption of the norm, will 
create international and domestic expectations for behaviour consistent with the norm.  
In other words, although the acceptance of the outcome document did not translate 
into decisive action in the case of Darfur, I would argue that it does represent progress 
for the norm of humanitarian intervention. 
 
Third, the discrepancy between the acceptance of the norm and its enactment 
highlights another distinctive feature of the humanitarian intervention norm.  Unlike 
many of the norms talked about in the norm evolution literature, humanitarian 
intervention is a prescriptive norm, not a prohibitive norm.  This makes its enactment 
distinctly less straightforward than a norm which merely constrains state behaviour.  
The capability of states to enact the norm is therefore crucial to its success, as was 
shown by the cases.  An area for further research might be whether prohibitive norms 
are likely to be more successful than those prescribing action. 
 
The final and related point to be made about the norm is that it is a foreign policy 
norm.  Some international norms, such as human rights and democracy norms, 
operate at the domestic level.  The process by which they become internalised is a 
domestic one, involving domestic institutionalisation and habitualisation.  As a norm 
prescribing a certain sort of foreign policy, humanitarian intervention is unlikely to go 
through such processes.  Although I am not necessarily questioning the potential for 
success of the norm, I would question whether it will ever become internalised in the 
way envisaged in Finnemore and Sikkink‟s model, whereby a norm becomes so 
normal that it no longer provokes debate.  As a foreign policy option entailing the use 
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of military force, humanitarian intervention will always prompt discussion, however 
far it has evolved.  Moreover, advocates of the norm accept that it will always be an 
exceptional response following the failure of non-forceful preventive measures.  
Perhaps, at its most successful, we could expect that the most discussion around 
humanitarian intervention would not be about whether to employ it, but about how, 
when and by whom. 
 
The future of humanitarian intervention 
Darfur demonstrated that the events of 9/11 fundamentally changed the international 
normative environment in which humanitarian intervention was becoming 
established.  The full effects of the global war on terror, and in particular the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, are yet to be seen, but already there are indications of a war-
weary West – both states and their domestic constituents.  Not only is capability an 
issue (especially in light of the global financial crisis), but perceptions of military 
intervention in general – both among those states not intervening currently, and 
among voters in those states that are – will affect the future prospects of the norm as a 
form of intervention, however noble its motives.  Moreover, as a result of concerns 
about their perceived international legitimacy, Western advocates of the norm 
engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly the US and the UK, may return to a 
more vocal support of state sovereignty.  There may have already been evidence of 
this in international deliberations over Darfur, as the US and UK reaffirmed Sudan‟s 
sovereignty to show that they still held a fundamental respect for the prevailing norms 
of international society. 
 
The future of humanitarian intervention is distinctly uncertain.  Will state sovereignty 
experience a resurgence as more traditional economic and security concerns push 
peacekeeping and humanitarianism lower down the agenda?  Perhaps, but increasing 
global interdependence and instant international communications have created a more 
permeable form of state sovereignty.  As Williams and Bellamy have argued, „There 
is an important paradox at the heart of the humanitarian intervention norm: it remains 
weak and contested, but its aspirations have had a profound impact on the way 
Western states, militaries and societies think about war.‟141  The success of the 
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humanitarian intervention norm so far lies in the fact that the international community 
can no longer turn a blind eye to grave violations of human rights – they are no longer 
purely internal affairs; its future success will be dependent on whether it can provoke 
decisive action in response to such atrocities.  Ironically, the stronger the 
humanitarian intervention norm becomes, the less likely it will need to be employed, 
as the very threat of forceful action should act as a deterrent to potential perpetrators 
of large-scale human rights abuse.  Unfortunately, this is far from the reality we face 
today. 
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